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A. Introduction and Issues of Methodology
The dates 1871, 1918 and 1933 mark two constitutional periods in Germany,
but they also mark the only period in history when Germany functioned as an
independent State, apart from the Third Reich. During the period 1871 to 1933,
an altogether free German intelligentsia and academia could reflect upon the
legal significance of that independence. Since 1949 and even after 1989
Germany has seen itself as tied into a Western system of alliances, including the
EU and the UN, where virtually all of its decisions are taken only in the closest
consultation with numerous Allies and the intelligentsia is tied into debating
within the parameters of an unquestionable Grundgesetz, or Basic Law. It will
be the argument of this inevitably too short paper that the earlier period is not
only significant in terms of German international law scholarship, but also
stimulating for the general history of international law doctrine. The acute
insecurity and unsettledness of Germany in this period provoked an appropriate
intensity of international law reflection, although international lawyers rarely
took central place in German intellectual culture.
It is not clear why constitutional rupture of 1918–1919 may be so important
because changes in government or constitution should not affect the
understandings that a country has of international law. The State itself remains
eternal. The request to write this article, i.e. to explore whether there is anything
“typisch deutsch” may possibly have had a technical or even antiquarian and
quaint aim. It could invite tedious and painstaking efforts to show the
distinctiveness of German approaches to such interminably obscure issues as
the legal nature of the institutions of, e.g. recognition or general customary law,
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or treaty, just to mention three at random. The confident expectation abroad
might be that systematic, and thorough Teutonic investigations of the very
foundations of these issues will ensure that they remain as obscure as always for
a very long time to come. These remarks are not made in jest. The sheer
industrial scale of the production of collaborative international law doctrine in
Germany during the period has convinced the author that no human being can
possibly ever have read all of it. The extent of the material will be indicated
shortly. Anyway, how would constitutional change increase or decrease the
likelihood that German approaches would converge or diverge from those of
other countries?
The fact remains that in France and Britain, not to mention the United States
of America, German international law doctrine during this period is held to be
very significantly different from other countries and for that reason
substantially responsible for the fact that Germany waged two major wars
against virtually all its neighbors in the period 1914 to 1945. In Britain leading
figures such as Brierly and Lauterpacht, and in France Le Fur and de
Dampierre, whose work was translated into English, argued that absolute
doctrines of sovereignty, theories of the will of the State and of the right to war,
were co-responsible for Germany’s having launched major wars. Numerous
other works, written during and after the World War, pointed the finger of
accusation at German international law doctrine. This is the theme which the
article will devote most attention to exploring. It directs focus to the question
how far German international lawyers developed a position on the most hotly
contested issue of the time, responsibility for the outbreak of the First World
War. It means looking at German international lawyers alongside other
disciplines within German intellectual culture and indeed in the wider
institutional political context of Germany. The question is what wider place did
the ideas of the international lawyers have in German society, and the purpose
of this question is to answer the very categorical views that their foreign
colleagues have had and probably continue to have until the present.
To lay stress on this internationalist and controversialist approach is to
diverge radically from two other very well developed and apparently
established views of how this period of the history of German international
legal doctrine should be approached. The field is already so full that it is not
possible, even in a short article, to proceed without recognizing and
commenting on this fact. It may appear invidious to devote a lot of space in a
short article to critical reflections on other treatments of the same topic, but my
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own approach diverges so radically from the others that some further reflection
on the differences of approach is unavoidable. The first approach is to follow
what in German is called Wissenschaftsgeschichte which might be translated
into English as the history of international law as a discipline in Germany. This
has been developed by Michael Stolleis in the Max Planck Institute for
European Legal History in numerous writings on the history of law of German
public law and of international law in this very period. A very succinct account
of the approach is proved by Ingo Hueck.1 Mention must also be made of the
numerous biographical histories of individual international lawyers that have
come out of the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History and German
universities on this period. For an exhaustive analysis of the field of German
international law doctrine, Wissenschaftsgeschichte would appear to be
essential, given the virtually industrial level of German international law
production. Consider the sheer scope of such series as the “Handbuch des
Völkerrechts” begun by Fritz Stier-Somlo, Professor at Bonn, in 1912, with the
cooperation of the leading well-known international lawyers at German
universities.2 This production ran into approximately three thousands pages in
the editions in the Aberdeen Law School Library, with publication continuing
until well into the Third Reich. There is also the “Encyklopedie der
Rechtswissenschaft,” also a team work led by Franz von Holtzendorff, of
Munich, which had numerous very substantial entries on different aspects of
international law. For instance, the fifth edition of 1890 had a large entry by
Holtzendorff, worked over by Professor Felix Stoerk, called “Das Europäische
Völkerrecht.”3 Closely related to von Holtzendorf is the work by Professor
August von Bulmerincq, of Heidelberg University, “Das Völkerrecht oder das
internationale Recht.”4 The seventh edition of von Holtzendorff led now by
Professor Josef Kohler of Berlin University, commissioned Professor Paul
Heilborn, of Breslau, to produce “Völkerrecht,” which was published in late
1914, after the war had begun.5 This is without mentioning the gigantic
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How is one to assess the significance of academic production on this scale
except in terms of Wissenschaftsgeschichte? There is a very significant strength
in this approach where Hueck objects that the development of the theory of
international law needs to understand its own internal dynamic and not become
lost or submerged in speculation about the possible impact on legal doctrine of
specific historical turning points. Hegemonial and national structures influence
the law but cannot determine what becomes long-term within the discipline,
according to Hueck.  He argues instead:  “[p]hi losophical  and
theoretical/historical movements, which may but need not necessarily coincide
with political or national historical upheaval are decisive.”7 This is in large
measure a justified reaction to Wilhelm Grewe’s Epochs of International Law.8
The work has been, as Hueck demonstrates, deeply influential upon the German
approaches to the history of international law.9 He notes how Grewe gives a
predominant weight to British hegemony in the nineteenth century, which
would hardly correspond to the argument that will be developed here, since my
assumption will be that since 1870 Germany was the determining focus of
international legal doctrine in Europe. The strength of the Frankfurt approach
should be that one acquires the tools to assess what were the dominant trends
within the discipline itself and who were the most influential figures.
However, this form of investigation has severe dangers of becoming self-
referential, provincial and even narcissist. Hueck quotes von Bulmerincq
himself as an authority that international law developed only very late in the last
third of the nineteenth century into an academic discipline, a sub-field of public
law.10 While mention is made of Franz von Liszt, of whom more later, and
Georg Jellinek, likewise, the distinguishing factors of their lives appear to be
institutional, university pressures,11 rather than how very serious people
The Evolution of International Legal Scholarship in Germany 1871–1933 5
Franz von Liszt und das Völkerrecht (2001). Much more importance is attached to von
Liszt’s agility in furthering his academic career, which included producing the standard
textbooks in criminal and international law, than in understanding his place as a leading
international lawyer and politician during the First World War. In the context of the
tragic and dramatic nature of modern German history this emphasis is simply morally
silly. His position in the eyes of Brown Scott and Hersch Lauterpacht will be considered
later.
12 Hueck (note 1), 203.
responded to their political environment. This leads Hueck to make the
judgment, which is extraordinary in the light of the above mentioned industrial
scale international legal production in which German international law teams
were engaged already before the First World War. He says that:
Scholars like von Liszt or Jellinek were the exception […]. Only a few experts on
international law, who were forced as a result of their lectureships to teach on the
history of international law were also involved in research or in the international field
of international law […]. Those working in the fields of public law and state law
were mainly concerned with internal domestic problems. The only area where any
importance was still placed on international law was in military and diplomatic
training. […] Thus until the Weimar Republic the international law lectureship at
Kiel University was the only one in existence at the twenty or more universities in
Germany. […] The first significant German expert on international law at this time
was Theodor Niemeyer. He founded the first major international law Chair at the
Kiel Law School and […] founded the German Society of International Law in
1916/17 […]. Despite this gradual professionalizing during the first decades of the
20th Century, there was no corresponding expansion of the subject of international
law at the universities and in the examination regulations.12
This approach appears also strange in the light of the foreign impression that
German international legal doctrine contributed significantly to the outbreak of
the First World War. However, Wissenschaftsgeschichte is very useful, because
such a virtually quantitative approach to the writing of international law history,
is in fact an extremely powerful sociological tool for assessing the real weight
of this intellectual work in German society. The Stolleis-Hueck approach helps
to prepare us for the paradox that German international lawyers could become
so misunderstood abroad. Their actual significance within Germany may well
have been really, rather little and hence their remoteness from strains of
German nationalism, as their remoteness from much less, was not appreciated
abroad. However, this is precisely why the Wissenschaftsgeschichte approach
will not be adopted as the main one in this article. Instead, the stress will be
upon assessing the significance of German international law doctrine in the
light of how it was perceived abroad in France and Britain. That will mean
placing German doctrine alongside other German thinking on international
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relations and Germany’s place in the international system. It will also mean
exploring how those outside the legal world in Germany perceived German
international law writing. To what extent did it address or avoid wider aspects
of German culture? To some extent Wissenschaftsgeschichte may help one to
locate significant figures, but even this is doubtful, given its primary concern
with the impact of intellectual activity on university and other academic
structures and not on the extent to which it meets challenges outside itself.
Indeed, the whole application of the Wissenschaftsgeschichte project to the
history of German international law doctrine, something I was privileged to
witness personally very close at hand, had always to me a strange character
because it appeared, a fortiore, to erase the only questions about German
international law doctrine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
which are likely to interest the world outside Germany, i.e. did these German
lawyers think that the First World War was in some sense legally justifiable and
that German conduct of the war was reasonable. Comically enough, this could
very well not become a question of Wissenschaftsgeschichte, if one takes the
so-called long view, as Hueck does, that the really significant institutional
developments (institutes, journals, university professorships etc.) which still
leave their mark on contemporary German international legal science only
appeared after 1918. That is precisely what Hueck has said in the long quotation
above. A more disturbing question is whether this is the whole point of
Wissenschaftsgeschichte? Maybe a reflection on the considerable investigations
by Koskenniemi of our field will throw more light on the question: what ever
happened to the First World War?
The second well developed exercise in international legal history has been by
Martti Koskenniemi in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, The Rise and Fall of
International Law 1870–1960.13 This work covers more than the period, but the
major part of the chapter on German scholarship is within the years 1870 and
1933 and if one considers also the treatment of Hans Morganthau and Carl
Schmitt in the final chapter ostensibly described as “Out of Europe,” then
Koskenniemi’s work comes to well over one hundred and thirty pages,14 much
more space than I have for this article. There is no way one can go around such
a vast undertaking. Thus the article on German international law doctrine
between 1870 and 1933 seems already to have been written? 
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Koskenniemi’s treatment of German doctrine places it in a wider context of
an international discipline which he identifies very loosely as a bourgeois,
liberal, humanist culture, committed to the role of reason in public life.
Beginning with the setting up of the Institute of International Law in 1873, he
traces how an international collaboration of scholars aims to “civilize” the
relations among States. They are, eventually, overwhelmed by nationalism and
mass society, and above all, a cult of force, the dark spirits of the twentieth
century. In the spiritual wasteland following 1945, the same profession has
abandoned spiritual, idealistic or other intellectual ambitions for a technical
pragmatism of functionalist institutional work, particularly the development of
the European Union. Now, presumably in Koskenniemi’s view, the WTO and
numerous specialist judicial tribunals would offer ever more opportunities for
international lawyers to lose their identities as academics. As a description of
the entire profession in the Western world over a period of one hundred years
this is an inevitably haphazard and impressionistic undertaking.
One may easily argue with the detail of the execution of this project, that it
lacks any acquaintance with the problems of writing intellectual history.15 The
difficulty with such criticism is, inevitably, that there are no bench marks for
how history should be written. It is simply silly of Bandeira Galindo to
pontificate that “[…] the use made of historiography […] does not mean taking
delight in the facts of the past; it is not a search for a lost time or a return to the
past due to a disillusionment with present times […].”16 Says who? Bandeira
Galindo is right to identify the declamatory, rhetorical, intuitive character of
Koskenniemi’s historical narrative. In my view he correctively identifies
Koskenniemi’s fundamental belief that the modern international lawyers,
beginning in 1873, were not internationalists, but cosmopolitans, with little
faith in States, hoping for increased contacts between peoples.17 In other words,
Bandeira Galindo is correct that Koskenniemi disregards the first principle of
intellectual history, set out by its archpriest Quentin Skinner, that analyzing the
past with a contemporary outlook can transmute history into myth. The non-
historian intellectual is concerned “with what that which was said or written
means today.”18 For the historian, the task is to place the interpretation of the
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past in its correct context, not transforming the past into a mere reflection of the
present.19
None of this critique takes away the legitimacy of Koskenniemi’s project to
set out a immense, nostalgic panorama, but it does highlight a problem with
relying upon Koskenniemi’s work for my project. He shares the ideals, mood,
spirit or whatever of the founders of the Institute of International Law and I do
not care about them, one way or the other. His identification goes so far that he
nowhere systematically explains exactly what were the foundations of their
beliefs, nor what was the exact character of the forces which defeated them. He
merely describes and demonstrates their defeat and his own, a complete
identification. Koskenniemi is worthy of comparison with Stefan Zweig’s, “Die
Welt von Gestern,” a semi-autobiographical work about turn of the twentieth
century Vienna, which he wrote in the two years before his suicide in 1941, and
which was published posthumously in Sweden in 1942. In other words, The
Gentle Civilizer of Nations is a huge achievement, but it will not help to
understand how German international lawyers understood the First World War.
For Koskenniemi the very question is distasteful. His own utter loathing of
nationalism and the conflicts which it has engendered means he has not been
able to bring himself even to mention the issues about which German
international lawyers may have disagreed with their neighbors. Erich
Kaufmann, as will be seen, was very widely regarded by a few of his colleagues
as the one actual German international lawyer significantly responsible for the
catastrophe of the First World War. Yet he is transported by Koskenniemi to the
Platonic dream world of his enforced retirement as a Jew during the Nazi
period, in Berlin-Nikolassee until 1938. 
Koskenniemi’s account of Kaufmann’s “Das Wesen des Völkerrechts und die
Clausula rebus sic stantibus” (1911)20 illustrates his own nostalgic, romantic
approach, divorced from the realities which are supposed by him to be
destroying both his and Kaufmann’s world. His first comment on the work is
that although it was written before the war, the war did little to discredit its
argument, “perhaps to the contrary,” adds Koskenniemi enigmatically. What is
vital to Koskenniemi is Kaufmann’s own subjective view that when he came to
give the Hague Academy lectures in 1935 he, Kaufmann, regarded Wesen
principally as a book in legal philosophy “and later recognised a certain
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youthfulness in the delight he had taken there for paradoxical formulations.”
Together with his later writings “what emerges is an oeuvre that seeks to escape
from the superficial rationalism and paralyzing dichotomies of liberal thought
and to understand – and to control – the world of public and international law as
a concrete reality.”21 After giving a flow of consciousness account of Wesen,
much detail of the book, but no historical context, Koskenniemi concludes his
reflections on the 1935 Hague Lectures, the polished up version of Wesen, with
the words: “[…] one cannot help thinking that as he assumed as international
lawyer, a priori, that the actual was the guarantee of the ideal, and that where
that did not seem to be the case, one was dealing with an inevitable historical
tragedy, this was already an intellectual escape into an imaginary kingdom of
dialectics; the compensation of defeat in today’s world by a theological faith in
victory in tomorrow’s.”22 With such reflections it is clear that Koskenniemi is
identifying himself subjectively with what he intuits to be the mood of
Kaufmann. These are his personal musings and as such (there are five hundred
pages) they have great imaginative and literary effect. I believe, however, the
underlying assumption of the book is identical to that of From Apology to
Utopia,23 rational argument is impossible and a study of attempts at it will
always descend into the picaresque.
Brief mention will be made of Carl Schmitt as he is treated in some respects
in a similar manner. Schmitt provided the most extensive critique of Versailles
and did the most to prepare the ground for a Nationalist Socialist international
law. One can hardly discuss his work hermeneutically, following the method of
Quentin Skinner, without assessing the context of a Germany which considered
the Versailles Treaty unjust.24 Yet Koskenniemi avoids this completely by
putting Schmitt in a final chapter of about a hundred pages where he prepares an
entirely rational and cogent argument concerning the connection between anti-
formalism and imperialism in the American context. Schmitt escapes
Koskenniemi’s nostalgia for pre-World War II Europe; he also escapes the time
warp of the book (1870 and 1960) and participates by proxy in post Cold War
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American debates in the 1990s, disproving, through the vigour and complexity
of his own (Koskenniemi’s argument) that philosophy of international law is
alive and well and, to paraphrase Mark Twain, rumours of its death are
exaggerated. However, something else has also happened. The epochal events
which surely must have provoked the crisis of humanity that concerns the book,
the two world wars, have been completely erased from Koskenniemi’s narrative:
all tragedy and no responsibility. That is no accident. A shrewd historian from
a remote Northern country has assessed that international legal history is not
ready to discuss the central questions facing international legal doctrine during
the period 1870 to 1933, or 1960 or whenever.25
B. Germany’s Security Situation Following Unification in 1871
as Background to the Outbreak of the First World War:
Political History (Hegelianism) and International Law
With the conclusion of this overview of some possible methodological
questions, it might now be clearer how one can justify the approach actually
adopted in the article. This will look to the complex dynamic of German foreign
policy and Germany’s relations with its neighbors as the contextual challenge
for an assessment of the quality of at least some German international law
writing. It is assumed that German international lawyers of this period are of
interest today in so far as they contribute to shedding light upon the foreign
policy and international relations dilemmas which Germany faced in the period.
Germany is taken to have posed problems for other States and mention is
already made of British and French reactions after 1914, where it becomes
widely assumed that there is in fact, unfortunately, a distinctively German
approach to international law.
The starting point of the analysis of German legal doctrine will be, therefore,
related to the international situation as seen through some German eyes as the
starting point of Gregor Schöllgen’s work, “Jenseits von Hitler: Die Deutschen
in der Weltpolitik von Bismarck bis heute.”26 In 1875, following French
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parliamentary moves to army reform and expansion, a fever of anxiety broke
out in Germany about the prospect of a preventive war against France, favored
by Helmuth Graf von Moltke, but not by the Chancellor, von Bismarck. Queen
Victoria wrote to the German Kaiser, Wilhelm: “The circumstance that France,
or any other neighbor waits for the first favorable moment to attack Germany,
is not a sufficient ground for a German attack. Such a Politic could be
successful for the moment, but it would necessarily, and rightly arouse the
general indignation of Europe and leave Germany without Allies or friends.”27
Schöllgen quotes Andreas Hillgruber, that, without question the threatening
consequences of the grounding of the Reich were catching up with it.28
Such citations immediately plunge the author into controversies of German
historiography. Is Schöllgen not a conservative, revisionist or whatever,
historian whose situation a foreign international lawyer is not likely to
appreciate? But the nature of all history writing is that one knows the
conclusion of the story before one begins to write it, and it is my intention to
give great prominence to the work of Hermann Kantorowicz, “Gutachten zur
Kriegsschuldfrage 1914.” He responds to the challenge of the Reichstag to
provide a legal opinion to respond to Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty,29 by
narrowing down the controversy about the extent of German war aims.
Kantorowicz accepts that Germany did launch a preventive war, while rejecting
the thesis that the war of 1914 was a premeditated German determination to
wage a war of aggression to attain some undefined notion of world power. The
author was a celebrated liberal German, for a short time a Professor at the
present Kiel Law Faculty, who had to emigrate from Germany to England in
1933 because of his Jewish background. The work was published only for the
first time in 1967 by Immanuel Geiss who was closer to Fritz Fischer in the
controversy he provoked, and with an accompanying preface from the German
President, Gustav Heinemann.30
So primary questions German international legal doctrine had to ask
concerned dilemmas as to how legal foundation and legitimacy could be given
to a State brought into existence through war or force, and whether force could
continue to be used to defend a State, whose apparent illegitimacy was a
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continuing fact. The striking and shocking fact which arises out of Hermann
Heller’s work, “Hegel und der nationale Machtstaatsgedanke in Deutschland,”
is that the formalism of nineteenth century public law theory of the state meant
that the development of the idea of Machtstaat during and beyond the Bismarck
era was through historians and not lawyers.31 Therefore the whole State
ideology which had been conceived to make possible the grounding of the
German State, receives the scantest attention from the lawyers. When foreign
voices look to representative figures they will mention non-legal figures and
identify these as the German international law doctrine. Heller points out that
through Gerber and Laband, Hegel’s idea of Machtstaat became constricted to
a formal definition of the idea of Staatsgewalt.32 Even with the most
representative Georg Jellinek, who often claimed affinity to Hegel, one finds
none of Hegel’s praise (Verherrlichung) of the State. Law for Jellinek, notes
Heller, does not have a creative role, but merely a preservative one.33
The lawyers are only interested in identifying a single organ which is the
exclusive owner of the legally binding State will, not derived from any other
body. This is known as the Staatsgewalt (the State Power). This usually came
to be the Monarch either concretely or as an abstract organ of the State. The
distinctive feature of the State personality, standing above individuals, is that it
is expressed in the concept of a unified State will. Despite constitutionalism and
divisions of powers, this rested, following Hegel, in the monarchical principle.34
The difficulty was whether the monarchical principle derived from a
constitution or expressed an ex post facto reflection upon a concentration of
power. Heller identifies this constitutional law problem as crucial to the identity
of Germany in a wider political, cultural sense of the word, because, quoting
Hintze, the contrast of the monarchical principle to the civil society (bürgerliche
Gesellschaft) marks Prussia and the German Reich which it grounded, as forced
by the general political situation, to be and to remain for the foreseeable future,
to remain as a military state.35 The idea of a unified concentration of power in
the Monarch is that it was supposed to prepare the State for external struggle,
The Evolution of International Legal Scholarship in Germany 1871–1933 13
36 Ibid., 169.
37 Ibid., 170.
38 Ibid., 172. Cf. Karl Theodor Pütter, Beiträge zur Völkerrechts-Geschichte und
Wissenschaft (1843).
39 August Wilhelm Heffter, Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (1844).
40 Heller (note 31), 174.
41 Ibid., 180.
by eliminating the danger of internal divisions.36 As will be seen later, these
constitutional deliberations are quite inconclusive for the outbreak of the First
World War, because of the contested role of the Kaiser in those events.
Heller hereby identifies the influence of Hegel not so much in constitutional
as in international law, where the huge implications for the closing in of itself of
the State as a unity meant that inter-state relations were power and not legal
relations. As a closed entity the State did not accept any binding obligation
coming from outside itself, a denial of universality.37 However, the key
institution, which determines whether Hegel really influenced mainstream
international law thinking, concerns the legal definition of war which follows
from Hegel’s perspective. Heller quotes Pütter’s definition, that, because of the
absolute self-sufficiency of States, each has an absolute right and war does not
decide which has right – they both have – but merely which right is fatefully or
historically blessed. World history is the world judge.38 The important point
Heller identifies is that these clear views are not accepted by the mainstream
German international law jurisprudence. Heffter, in his authoritative “Das
Europäische Völkerrecht,” explicitly rejected Hegelianism.39 International law
rests on the common conviction of States and Heffter rejected the idea that the
only law the State recognizes is what is in its own interest and coming from its
own will. For such a perspective there would be no international law at all, only
power relations. War may only be an extreme necessity, and then only when
one has not brought about the danger oneself.40
Heller singles out instead a number of “philosophical historians” as the key
connecting points between Hegel and German politics. The first significant
figure among the historians is Johann Gustav Droysen. The nature of the State
is power, not law, and State power goes before law. International law has only
a place so far as it serves power.41 After the Frankfurt National Assembly and
the rejection of the Crown by Friedrich Wilhelm IV he wrote “Prussia and the
System of the Great Powers,” saying the German question is one of power; the
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powerlessness is imposed by the Westphalia and Vienna settlements and the
task of the monarchical principle is to overcome this. Similarly Max Duncker
defended the monarchical against the democratic principle, and said, in Heller’s
words: “Die Eroberung müsse eine moralisch-politische und militärische sein,
die Regierungen müßten vor vollendete Tatsachen gestellt werden.”42 As
adviser to the Crown Prince from 1861, and for the conflict with Austria in
1866 he advised that it would just about un-right for Prussia not to decide the
matter with weapons. The same recommendation came for the 1870 war with
France, that Metz and Alsace should be seized, as France will seek revenge
anyway. Heller treats this figure as key in showing the influence of Hegel on
Bismarck’s actions.43 The most significant figure of all, the man Bismarck
appointed to the position of Leiter des Literarischen Büros of the government
in 1877, is Constantin Rößler.44 His System der Staatslehre is the most direct
bridge between Hegel and Bismarck, deserving of the fullest attention.45
Rößler insists the monarchical principle is not there for the people, but to
fulfil its own idea of itself.46 It has no purpose but the preservation of power,
and the drive to conquest is not an arbitrary passion, but of a spiritual nature.
Vitally, Rößler writes: “Solange ein Volk noch Machtsphären außer sich hat,
erscheint ihm sein Dasein als ein zufälliges und unberechtiges.”47 This for
Heller means the imperialism of Hegel’s universalism. National instincts of
power are always the command of a Higher Spirit. So, in Rößler’s words, “Jede
Volksnatur hat das Recht, ja man muß sagen, die Pflicht, den Bereich ihrer
Macht so weit auszudehnen, als ihre Kraft reicht, d. h. in Wahrheit und auf die
Dauer reicht. […] Die starken Nationen haben aber den Beruf und die Pflicht,
die Welt zu teilen.”48 War is not a kind of civil legal process. “Es gibt zur
Herrschaft nur einen Titel, die Kraft, und für diesen Titel nur einen Erweis, den
Krieg.”49 For Heller, there is no historical means of demonstrating an exact link
between Bismarck and Hegel, e.g. through Bismarck’s diaries, but Hegel’s
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theory was Bismarck’s practice, and Hegel’s ideas were so widespread in
Germany at the time, that such was the atmosphere in which Bismarck moved.50
It is after considering Rößler that Heller comes to the well known figure of
Alfred Lasson. “Prinzip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts,” is written in the period
of the grounding of the German Reich.51 This is a work of Hegelian philosophy.
The very existence of different States provokes them to struggle against one
another and war is not decided according to a Rechtsbuch, but instead the better
State is the stronger State. There is no judge over the States but world history
etc. Here there is nothing original but its influence is widespread. The unlimited
sovereignty of the State makes all legally binding obligations impossible.
International law is only a collection of rules of prudence and treaties bind only
as long as they do not contradict the interest of either State.52
However, Heller considers Hegel himself the best exponent of his own ideas
and brings out in the section Machtstaatgedanke nach außen the relationship
between his ideas and the old natural law, as well as his ideas on the crucial
distinction between defensive and offensive war, including the idea of
preventive war. The first issue was to be become crucial as it affected
perceptions abroad about German attitudes to compliance with international
law. Hegel, particularly in the section Die Verfassung Deutschlands contrasts
the dream world of natural law and the politics of the facts, such as the partition
of Poland.53 Crucial for Hegel was to reconcile idealism with realism. So
Hegel’s solution was, somehow, to argue that material power was to be infused
with a spiritual and ideal quality, so that the power of the State was never to be
understood merely as military-physical, but also ethical-historical.54
Traditionally, natural law thinking supposed an opposition between Power and
Law, Power and Freedom, between which no mediation was possible. For
Hegel, there was no conceptual construction, which did not itself mediate with
its opposite. All concepts exist in relation and drive one another mutually.
Mediation meant dialectic, and Hegel’s monism meant: aller Geist wird Macht,
aber auch alle Macht wird geistig.55
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This depends upon a new idea of law, not basing individual right or State
legitimacy on private contract, both of which isolate the individual, but instead
the individual should devote himself to a transpersonal State, the national State
community, a modern idea of a transpersonal ideal of a national Great Power,
where the individual becomes moral. Heller notes how Meinecke sees the
distinction between the old idea of Great Power and the new idea, that in the
former the people are simply driven, pulled along, while in the new idea, the
drive to power comes from below. So the people no longer see a contradiction
between themselves and the Regent, because both are united in a common idea,
so that the sovereignty of the people and the monarch are again dialectically
won over in the sovereignty of the State. The conflict which natural law sees
between people and ruler is overcome in a dialectical unity, where domestic
politics are subordinated to an expansive foreign policy.56
It is in the context of such an expansive foreign policy that Hegel wants to
interpret the causes of war. The State should find causes of war even where
none exist, to serve not only its people, but also the World Spirit. These causes
will be undefinable, because the State can find its infinity and its honor in
whatever single detail it cares to lay it. This brings Heller to the idea of
preventive war. As an example of this “creative searching” for causes of war,
Heller quotes directly from Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie, para. 335:
[…] the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just
taking notice of an injury after it has occurred. On the contrary there arises in
addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury as the idea of a danger
threatening from another state, together with the calculations of degrees of
probability on this side and that, guessing at intentions etc.etc.57
Heller relies on Rechtsphilosophie again for the proposition that if a State is
in jeopardy, all the citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to defense.
Para. 326 reads: “If in such circumstances the entire State is under arms and is
torn from its domestic life at home to fight abroad, the war of defense turns into
a war of conquest.”58 Heller comments that we have already seen from Die
Verfassung Deutschlands that Hegel does not distinguish defensive and
offensive wars, both equally just and both wars of conquest.59 The natural law
foundation of international law is abstract, and therefore the only way forward
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for Hegel is to oppose it to the concrete national-machtstaatliche principle.60
Heller sees that this tension undermines any idea of restraint on the use of force,
because the greater the power of the State, the greater the part it has in the
movement of the World Spirit, meaning that Hegel’s followers interpreted the
doctrine as calling for forceful expansion without any given limits, meaning in
contemporary language, imperialism.61
Hegel’s conflictive dialectic means a rejection of both the natural law
tradition from Grotius through Hobbes and Pufendorf, and the positivists such
as Johann Ludwig Klüber and Johann Jacob Moser, the latter having no
foundation in a philosophy of history with which to bring together
systematically international legal custom and treaties. The positivist and
naturalist principles fall apart from one another. However, at the same time
what Heller’s exhaustive analysis makes clear is that no major German
international lawyer, except Erich Kaufmann, subscribed to this legal
philosophy. The concept of a universal principle of law after the Napoleonic
Wars remained in the form of a romantic, universalist principle used to ground
international legal science. This was represented most fully in the work of
Kaltenborn von Stachau’s “Kritik des Völkerrechts.”62
A systematic attempt by a lawyer to mount an attack on the continued
adherence of mainstream international law to the universalism of the Grotian
tradition was made in 1888 by Heinrich Rettich in his “Zur Theorie und
Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege.”63 This challenges the orthodox views about
the legal definition of war, but thereby at the same time serves to show that
among lawyers these ideas remained undisturbed. Here is where the method of
Wissenschaftsgeschichte can come to our aid in identifying significant
international lawyers. Rettich himself does not appear to be a prominent
German academic international lawyer, but his lucid critique of the mainstream
helps to focus attention on the fact that the dominant orthodoxy in the question
of the legal nature of war was quite indifferent to the new Hegelianism and
remained attached to the wider European tradition going back to Vattel and
Grotius. Rettich is going to argue that it is natural law that is responsible for the
idea that war is a legal process, and that such ideas are still prevalent in German
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international law. History has to demonstrate that war had another role than as
a procedural remedy.64 Instead the authoritative von Bulmerincq appears simply
to be continuing in the late 1880s in Germany a natural law doctrine, going
back to Grotius, Wolff and the whole philosophical tradition of international
law. His statement: “Krieg ist seinem rechtlichen Begriff nach ein gewaltsames
Rechtsmittel zur Verteidigung des Rechtszustandes zwischen den Staaten,”
raises the complaint from Rettich that he does not know if von Bulmerincq
writes philosophy or law. In fact, Rettich does know. The view of war,
represented by non-philosophical positivists (i.e. non-Hegelians) like Moser and
Martens is that war has legal consequences but is not itself a legal idea. The
view of war as a legal institution in von Bulmerincq’s sense is that the
international legal order is a complete, organically integrated whole. War is
then the formal means to protect the whole material system of international law
rules. For Rettich, this is pure philosophy, following Pufendorf and
Thomasius.65
Rettich identifies how von Bulmerincq constructs a framework for
determining whether there is a justifiable ground for going to war, whether a
violation of an individual State right is sufficiently serious to warrant the
extreme measure of the resort to war. Rettich is very sceptical whether such a
distinction is sound in juridical terms, given that war is supposed, in von
Bulmerincq’s system, to be a legal remedy, part of procedural law. Procedural
law does not understand the distinction between legal rights which are worthy
of legal enforcement and legal rights which are not so worthy. This type of
argument is being used by Rettich as a device to undermine the legal technical
seriousness of what von Bulmerincq is proposing. He admits that there is a
scheme for distinguishing the two. Wars should be fought over breaches of the
fundamental rights of States.66
Von Bulmerincq adheres to the usual catalogue of rights, to existence,
respect, equality and the right to communicate and have relations with other
States in the international community. It is these fundamental rights which
States are entitled to defend by going to war. Rettich concentrates an attack on
the right to existence, without addressing at a systematic level, that what the
framework of fundamental rights of States excludes is precisely wars of
The Evolution of International Legal Scholarship in Germany 1871–1933 19
67 Ibid., 53–64.
68 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht, 2 vols. (1877, 1883).
69 Rettich (note 63), 65–66.
conquest to upset the status quo. Whatever ambiguity there may be around the
edges of the right to respect or to existence, clearly these rights exclude military
action to upset the whole status quo in Europe. What Rettich has unwittingly
revealed is that classical international law, as represented by von Bulmerincq,
was not so disturbed by the possibility of disagreement about rights that they
would effectively abandon the whole idea that there was a complete
international legal order in favor of the idea that a discrete law of peace could
be disturbed by the phenomenon of war, which was understood as an extra-legal
concept encroaching like a fungus.67
Rettich devoted special energy to attacking a State’s right to existence.
Obviously in an abstract sense the State has such a right, but it attends
especially to the human beings within the State. However, States will fulfil the
duty to protect their populations with different levels of competence, and so a
less competent State can lose its right, since international law is there for human
beings and not visa versa. Anything else would mean an unconditional right to
an unlimited existence, for any State that had ever existed. That would bring
public life to a permanent still stand. As international law recognizes all new
States that break their way into existence, international law must be consistent
about recognizing the forceful means by which new acquisitions come into
place. States, even von Holtzendorff admits, must prove lebensfähig and that
can only be tested through the struggle of war. Rettich is not following Hegel,
but makes specific reference to Rudolf von Jhering and his celebrated “Der
Zweck im Recht.”68 That the ethical standpoint gives way to the historical
developments, making not the attack but the defense, i.e. the resistance to
attack, is what will be judged by world history.69
However, if one considers the events of 1914, the assassination of the Crown
Prince of Austria-Hungary, the tensions caused within Austria by the Serbian
Slav agitation, Rettich’s portrayal of von Bulmerincq’s thinking is less than
persuasive. There was a clear density in regulation in the latter’s thought that
foresaw crises which could, other things being equal, have made war by the
Central Powers justified. Particularly relevant is the right to mutual respect.
Very strangely Rettich accepts that there is a clear rule of international law
requiring respect towards the Head of State and his diplomats. Clearly here
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there would be a legal right to respond with war. However, Rettich says such a
situation is unimaginably antiquated among civilized States, which goes again
to show how von Bulmerincq cannot demonstrate how his criteria for justifying
some and not other wars could be important in contemporary practice.70 Yet von
Bulmerincq had clear prescriptions for the eventuality that one State used its
ethnic minorities within another State to foment unrest in its neighbor, with a
view to subverting its existence. Von Bulmerincq defines the State’s right to
existence comprehensively to exclude a neighbor deliberately damaging its
territory, population or government form. He goes on very specifically to cover
almost exactly the conditions of 1914:
Die auf Grund des Stamm- oder Nationalitätsprinzips von einem Staate in einem
anderen unternommenen Agitationen, um die stammverwandte Bevölkerung zum
Abfall zu bewegen, ist daher als Verletzung eines wesentlichen völkerrechtlichen
Grundsatzes zu betrachten. Eine Beihilfe anderer Staaten zu Erhaltung eines in seiner
Existenz bedrohten Staates wird freiwillig oder vertragsmäßig, besonders im Falle
übernommener Garantie geleistet werden können oder müssen, aber als rechtliche
Verpflichtung nicht beansprucht werden können.71
Rettich concludes by asserting a right to war which is remarkably close to
what is now thought to have been the legal situation in the nineteenth century.
For Rettich war is a non-legal relationship of States, where each uses its force to
compel the other to submit to its will. It has legal consequences, but is not itself
a legal relation.72 Meanwhile, there is actually a legal right of States to go to
war wherever they consider it useful or serving their interests, a specific
rejection of von Bulmerincq’s war as a legal process. Rettich argues that this is
a consistent practice of States satisfying the standard of customary law and can
be formulated as a legal rule:
Es ist daher das, einerseits aus dieser stillschweigenden, durch die thatsächliche
Übung ausnahmslos bewährten Übereinstimmung der Staaten und andererseits aus
der eigentümlichen Natur des Krieges beruhende ‘Recht zum Kriege’ in dem
nachfolgend formulierten Satze präzisiert:
Die Überzeugung des Staates, einen für sein Wohl nötigen Zweck nur auf
kriegerischem Wege erreichen zu können, ist der stetsfort gültige Rechtstitel zur
Erklärung des Krieges […].73
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It would be tedious to go through von Bulmerincq’s text again, except to note
that the major part of Rettich’s discussions concerns what he calls material
international law, the rights of subjects, and fundamental rights, which were
enumerated in other European countries. Von Bulmerincq frequently cites
Robert Phillimore from England.74 However, it is worthwhile to quote him
precisely on the right to war, das Recht zum Kriege, because it appears to cover
precisely all elements of the 1914 crisis:
Zur Anwendung dieses Rechtsmittels ist jeder Staat berechtigt, welcher in seinen
wesentlichen Rechten, besonders den allen Staaten völkerrechtlich zustehenden
Rechten [the fundamental rights, at 202–206] durch einen anderen Staat verletzt
wurde und trotz vorhergehender Anwendung gütlicher oder geringerer gewaltthätiger
Mittel, wie Retorsion und Repressalien, Genugthuung nicht erlangen konnte. Auf
Seiten desjenigen kriegsführenden Theiles, welcher durch den Krieg sein Recht
vertheidigt, heißt der Krieg Vertheidigungs- oder Defensivkrieg, auf Seiten
desjenigen, welcher das Recht des anderen Staates verletzte, Angriffs- oder
Offensivkrieg. Nur der Vertheidigungskrieg ist völkerrechtlich gerechtfertigt. Von
welchem Staat der faktische Angriff ausging, ist gleichgiltig. Die Dauer eines
Krieges darf sich erstrecken bis zur Erlangung der Genugthuung und einer
Entschädigung, falls die abgenöthigte Vertheidigung mit materiellen Opfern
verknüpft war.75
Strikingly, von Bulmerincq was not able to, or did not care to take account of
Rettich’s 1888 published book in the second edition of his 1884 text. However,
Franz von Holtzendorff, revised by Felix Stoerk, (von Holtzendorff died in
1889) cites Rettich, and of course also cites von Bulmerincq in his 1890 fifth
edition of “Das Europäische Völkerrecht.”76 Indeed one has to remark from the
literature cited, in contrast to the much narrower reading of von Bulmerincq, the
richness of the bibliographical references in terms of philosophy, politics and
social theory. Von Bulmerincq sticks to strictly legal titles. The irony is of
course, that natural law thinking is firmly embedded, as Rettich sees, in
mainstream German international law thinking at the end of the second decade
of the new German Empire.77 A clear influence of Rettich emerges in the text of
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International Legal Arguments. ‘Positivist’ International Law Scholar August von
Bulmerincq (1822–1890) and His Concept of Politics, JHIL 7 (2005), 181. It appears
from his analysis that what von Bulmerincq really means is that the idea of law as
distinct from the idea of politics, means firm obligation excluding discretion and choice.
In fact as Mälksoo shows clearly from consideration of numerous of his texts von
Bulmerincq is preserving precisely the distinction which Heller showed Hegelianism
wished to fudge, the distinction between law and force. “The maxim of politics is: force
rules over law. The maxim of the law is: law rules over force,” see id., JHIL 7 (2005),
191–192. Unfortunately Mälksoo does not analyze von Bulmerincq’s major international
law work.
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von Holtzendorff, but it does not swamp the fundamental idea of war as a legal
process, and von Holtzendorff clearly excludes war as an instrument to make a
basic change of the status quo. The difference from von Bulmerincq is one of
emphasis. Each side will maintain that it has legal right on its side, where one
alleges that another has violated its rights. War is still defined as forceful self-
help of States for the upholding of their rights, which cannot be protected in a
peaceful way.78 It will be seen that in 1914 every word here used will count
with all the Powers. The lack of impartial, just arbitration of disputes, and also
the inevitable competitiveness and conflict or struggle of interest, which is
common to all human life, makes war unavoidable as forceful self-help.
However, the progress in the construction of international law can be seen in
the fact, that “Kriege zum Zwecke der Eroberung und eigennützigen
Übervorteilung eines schwächeren Staates vom Gewissen der Nationen
verworfen werden und der Rechtscharakter des Krieges in seiner bedingten
Notwendigkeit stets deutlicher hervortritt.”79 Following von Bulmerincq, von
Holtzendorff says that not just any violation of legal right justifies war
politically and morally, but only one involving interests which are so high as to
put the very existence of the nation in play. Nonetheless in the struggle over
rights, it is impossible to say which of the “beherrschenden geschichtlichen
Potenzen” has the legal right, and it will be decided by whoever is superior in
the exercise of force: “Der Staat ist Rechts- und Machtorganismus und
demnach der Krieg das Schiedsgericht der Waffen.” Von Holtzendorff can hear
Hegel breathing in his ear. One cannot say objectively from among the States
waging war, which one of the two alone has the legal right, as one would have
to in a normal legal process (“wie unter den Prozessparteien”).80
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The major textbook writer of international law who breaks with the
usefulness of war as an instrument of legal process is Emanuel Ullmann, who
succeeded to the Munich Chair of Law (Professor der Rechte) of von
Holtzendorff in 1889. In his “Völkerrecht”81 he is aware of the view that wars
are fought for the enforcement or the defense of “wirklichen oder
vermeintlichen Rechtsansprüchen.”82 However, in fact wars are fought to
resolve political problems in the international community and for other reasons
where it is not possible to see a legal aspect. Therefore, for the definition of war
the goal and cause are not decisive.83 Ullmann goes on to note that in practice
the language of offensive and defensive war is used and that it is usual to
connect the distinction with the question of just grounds for war. He notes that
the practice is to identify a war as offensive, when one side has brought about
a war without a legal ground. This means the attacker is not the one who
declared war or first began the actual hostilities, but the one who actually
caused the war, in the sense of making it necessary or unavoidable for the other
State. Here he refers to the wars of 1859 and 1866 where in the legal aspect
Italy was the attacker, and in the military aspect, Austria. In 1870, France was,
in both the legal and the military aspect, the attacker. According to this
approach the defensive war is a just war and the offensive war is contrary to
law, thus illegal, i.e. not a legally motivated war. In practice, however, remarks
Ullmann, the question whose side is in the Right is regularly doubtful and in
any case disputed. As in international law no sovereign State recognizes as
authoritative the judgment of another State over its conduct, so the consistent
position to take is that each State is entitled to bring about a situation of war, in
international law. The war itself will be a kind of judgment of God, which will
set out what is in future the practically valid law among the quarreling parties.84
This text is very carefully worded and marks a difference in philosophical
style from von Holtzendorff and von Bulmerincq. Koskenniemi’s comments on
Ullmann, although not directed to his views about war, are very helpful here.
He asserts the importance of Ullmann, an Austrian, who succeeded to von
Holtzendorff’s Chair, by saying “German lawyers were moving into more
sociological language.”85 His 1898 textbook came to replace Heffter’s and to
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compete with Franz von Liszt’s.86 In this light Ullmann can be taken to say that,
in his view, the dominant international law discourse–that of his predecessor for
example–uses the language of war as legal processes, but language does not
stand up to close scrutiny of State practice. However, he goes on to say the
language has been used to describe the most important conflicts involving
Austria, and Prussia/Germany in recent years. Wars usually are described as
offensive and defensive. By 1898 Europe was in thrall to systems of alliances
explicitly defensive in character, which would be in play in 1914. Ullmann is
still skeptical about the practical use of the dichotomy offensive/defensive.
However, his objection is purely sociological, not a historical-philosophical
Hegelianism.87 As he comes to speak of State sovereignty, he concludes by
saying that, whatever one thinks of the legal claims of the parties, the outcome
of the war will serve as a divine judgment setting down what is to be the law
binding on the quarreling parties in the future. In other words, there is no
escaping the tendency of States in Ullmann’s time to think of war as a legal
process and treat its outcome as a legal judgment, even although he himself
thinks this is pretty unconvincing and contradictory, given the disputes which
persist about who has right on its side and given the central place of the
sovereign equality of States and the lack of a legal authority standing over
them.
As 1914 draws closer, there are a number of significant textbook writers,
whose views are interesting. They appear more superficial than the writers of
the 1880s and 1890s, as perhaps theoretical interest declined. This appears
particularly true of the person accepted to be the leading figure among textbook
writers, Franz von Liszt. For instance, in the fourth edition of his “Das
Völkerrecht,”88 he writes that the most extreme means of enforcing a real or
supposed claim, the ultima ratio for the resolution of international law disputes,
is war. Von Liszt’s very brief annotated commentary to this one of his bullet-
point propositions, of which the textbook consists, includes a reference to
Georg Jellinek’s view that wars are the main builders of States, but
accompanies it by saying world wide peace movements endeavor to achieve
permanent arbitration and a development of the law of war restricting its evils
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as much as possible.89 The final edition, completed in December 1917, does not
alter its bullet-point in paragraph 39.90 Von Liszt’s commentary is totally
changed and now makes the extraordinary lapidary point that the World War
proves how particularly the expansion of war technology and the importance of
a decision which involves the total defeat of the opponent both serve to make
the outcome of the war all the less dependent upon the start of it. Thereby, the
rationality of this ultima ratio is all the more to be put to debate again. 
These are extraordinarily brief remarks to be found in what is supposed to be
the leading textbook before the First World War in Germany. Nothing could be
clearer than that von Liszt is not an intellectual warmonger whose firebrand
ideas have driven the world’s greatest military power to plunge Europe into
catastrophe. Quite the contrary, I think that what needs explaining is the utter
mediocrity of this contribution to the thinking about war. Herrmann’s already
mentioned study speaks of “die Werkgeschichte des ‘Völkerrechts’ – eine
Erfolgstory.”91 Herrmann begins by quoting the pacifist Hans Wehberg’s
review of the ninth edition of 1913, where the latter correctly identifies the
direction of von Liszt “Wir Pazifisten dürfen dem Werke noch seine
fortschrittliche Gesinnung nachrühmen, die in dem vorliegenden Bande
besonders hervortritt.”92 Wissenschaftsgeschichte can tell that the conditions for
the success of a textbook, this one with unusual sales, is to be found in the
general scientific field and not the scientific authority of the book itself.93 This
is where the method is important in trying to read the significance of an
undoubtedly peaceful orientation of the most popular German international law
textbook in 1913.
Herrmann talks vaguely about the wider political culture of Germany at that
time, the excessive stress on the Nation State, national consciousness, the
primacy of absolute sovereignty–all amounting to an environment which would
lead to no particular demand for international law.94 This speculation is not
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, because it merely subscribes, as do Hueck and
Koskenniemi, to the “Dark Times” theory of twentieth century history. Von
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97 Another work, equally thin, but well established in the profession is by Paul
Heilborn. He included a contribution, Völkerrecht, to a 1904 6th edition of von
Holtzendorff (note 3), 481–578 now edited by Josef Kohler. It is equally cursory over
the concept of war. It repeats the von Holtzendorff perspective, without qualification
that war is the means of self help to ensure the enforcement of rights and interest. It is
the means to bend the will of other States to a recognition of these interests. At the same
time there are no rules over when a war may or may not be waged and there are no
international legal causes of war. This is less than a paragraph.
Liszt complains in 1910 that foreign policy is a terra incognita for most
Jurists,95 but that could just as well be taken as aggressive campaigning by a
very successful publicist who knows he will have an audience. Von Liszt was a
member of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies. It is possible that Herrmann gets
closer to the reality when he describes von Liszt’s otherwise, in my view,
disappointing book, as free from legal philosophical and theoretical thoughts. It
refrains from even presenting controversial views and he avoided taking any
political stance.96 None of this adds up to a scientific explanation of the success
of von Liszt’s book. In particular Herrmann does not try to argue that the
general intellectual climate in the years immediately preceding 1914 was
particularly thin.97 Herrmann might just as well have speculated that von Liszt
was so popular because he was himself vaguely conciliatory in his tone and
avoided controversy, qualities usually esteemed in professional people.
I suggest, as a conclusion to this section of the article, the following partially
speculative explanation of where we are left with as regards doctrine in 1914.
The 1880s continuance of the natural law doctrine was never formally rejected
except by a very intellectually sharp figure such as Rettich. More “sociological”
figures such as Ullmann were skeptical about the categories of von Bulermincq
and von Holtzendorff, in terms of the nature of inter-state conflict. However,
Europe was relatively peaceful and a leading figure such as von Liszt hoped that
the international legal community could be pushed in the direction of more and
more arbitration and more restrictive laws of war. We know his views enjoyed
great popularity and respect. There was a recognition that the actual treaty
practice of the European Powers was built openly upon the classical distinction
between defensive and offensive wars. The treaties were for defense and
maintenance of the status quo. This was worlds away from Hegel’s
philosophical-history of futuristic apocalyptic violence. None of the platitudes
of von Liszt or Heilborn or Ullmann ever argued that there could be legally a
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war of conquest in Europe with a view to upsetting the whole balance of power
and territorial settlement.
This appears clearer in some presentations of the subject, which were more
discursive or argumentative than textbooks. For instance, Professor Peter
Resch’s “Das Moderne Kriegsrecht der Civilisirten Staatenwelt”98 sets out the
classical view, following Heffter and Bluntschli, that the cause of a war may be
a legal quarrel, but the war itself is a physical struggle of wills. Then he
continues: “Die Frage nach der Erlaubtheit des Krieges überhaupt und nach
den Voraussetzungen eines gerechten Krieges im besonderen gehört nicht in die
Lehre vom positiven europäischen Völkerrechte.”99 This is only to say there is
no rule of law which prohibits war as such, and there is no continued discussion
of the much earlier international law debates about the just war in the modern
European international law. However, Resch goes on immediately to say that a
most important legal distinction of wars is defensive and offensive. If one is to
regard the offensive as unjust but the defensive as just, this must be with an
understanding that the offensive party is the one that has first violated the
law.100 In other words, war is still understood as a legally defensive mechanism,
with no place for a conquest.
Another study, running into its ninth edition in 1913, August Quaritsch’s
“Völkerrecht und Auswärtige Politik”101 follows a similar line. The laws of war
cannot pay any attention to the innumerable grounds that can be invented for
going to war, whether to defend a legal claim or some other interest, such as
nationality, independence or even to serve commercial interests. The grounds
given may in any case be only a pretext. For these reasons, the laws of war can
ignore the distinctions that are made in practice between legal and illegal wars,
defensive and offensive wars. Nevertheless, a vital qualification is added in this
book, which is directed in a much more focused way than von Liszt’s university
textbook, to contemporary debates about foreign policy. Concerning the
distinction between offensive and defensive wars, Quaritsch writes: “Dennoch
ist der letztere Begriff von großer Bedeutung, weil häufig bei Bündnisverträgen
(so auch bei dem Dreibund) der casus foederis, die Verpflichtung zum
Beistande, nur Platz greift, wenn der eine oder der andere Staat ‘angegriffen’
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wird.”102 Quaritsch refers back to the 1879 German-Austrian Alliance,
published first in 1888, as the European situation appeared to require, so that no
one would be in any doubt about the defensive character of the Alliance.103 All
of these propositions remain unaltered from the eighth edition brought out by
Quaritsch alone, in 1908.104
C. Legal Responsibility for the Outbreak of the First World War,
 English and French Views of German International Law
after the Outbreak of War
Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles provides as follows:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the
responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which
the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a
consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her
allies.
Article 227 provides:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern,
formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and
the sanctity of treaties.
A special Tribunal will be constituted to try the accused […]
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international
policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international
undertakings and the validity of international morality […]
These documents are supported by a Report of the Commission on the
responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.105
The Report insists that the responsibility of the authors of the war “lies wholly
upon the Powers which declared war in pursuance of a policy of aggression, the
concealment of which gives to the origin of this war the character of a dark
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conspiracy against the peace of Europe. This responsibility rests first on
Germany and Austria, secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria. The responsibility is
made all the graver by reason of the violation by Germany and Austria of the
neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, which they themselves had
guaranteed.”106
It is not intended, for reasons of time and space, to explore the question of
the violation of Belgian neutrality or the German arguments of necessity. The
more general question of the right to war is all that will be attempted to be
explored here. Indeed, the response of the German Delegation to the Report did
not choose to take issue with the statements about Belgium. As the German
Chancellor said in 1914, it was “a wrong to be made good.” The response
continued: “They regret that during the war this conception was temporarily
abandoned and that a subsequent justification of the German irruption should
have been attempted.”107
In the light of the apparently widely held view, that in the Europe of the pre-
war there was an unrestricted right to go to war in international law, it is very
important to look closely to the terms of the Report by the Commission. Of
course, it is possible to say that the legal issue of guilt was itself determined by
a Treaty which Germany accepted through signature. However, the language of
aggression and pre-meditation is used on its first page.108 The Report argues that
Germany, believing itself to be overwhelmingly superior militarily, used the
Sarajevo killing as a pretext with which to provoke a war. Germany supported
Austria to put demands to Serbia, which it knew it could not accept. Germany
also knew that Russia could not stand aside if Serbia was attacked. So,
Germany wanted the conflagration. All of the Entente Powers, including
Russia, attempted to mediate, including a Russian offer of arbitration, but were
rejected by Germany and Austria, who only wanted war. So, after his analysis
the Report ends in italics, saying that the war was premeditated by the Central
Powers and conciliatory proposals were deliberately defeated.109 In addition it
is worth stressing that the Report considered Austria had suffered no wrong:
“The act, committed as it was by a subject of Austria-Hungary on Austro-
Hungarian territory, could in no wise compromise Serbia, which very correctly
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expressed its condolences and stopped public rejoicings in Belgrade. If the
Government of Vienna thought that there was any complicity, Serbia was ready
to seek out the guilty parties.”110
The view which the Report appears to represent was that war should be used
only to defend a legal right, that every effort should be made to defend it firstly
through peaceful means, and that, in any case, no legal right had been violated.
Instead a country had chosen to treat the pretext of a legal violation to set off on
a war of conquest. That should be punished as a crime. There were numerous
very prominent legal and international legal names associated with the Report,
including: Robert Lansing, Sir Ernest Pollock, Nicholas Politis, Edouard Rolin-
Jaequemyns, Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle. There is a clear statement in
Article 231 of an obviously legally binding treaty that Germany accepts that it
has committed aggression. The argument of this article is that the perception of
Germany abroad, partially induced by perceptions of German views of
international law permitting wars of conquest, was that it did undertake a
premeditated act of aggression.
Yet Article 227 appears to say that the German Kaiser can only be charged
with a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties, the latter being a reference to the guaranteed neutrality of Belgium and
Luxemburg. Presumably with respect to both Article 231 and Article 227 the
Commission Report says:
The premeditation of a war of aggression, dissimulated under a peaceful pretence,
then suddenly declared under false pretexts, is conduct which the public conscience
reproves and which history will condemn, but by reason of the purely optional
character of the institutions at the Hague for the maintenance of peace (International
Commission of Inquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of aggression may not be
considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be
successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to
consider under its terms of reference.111
Brownlie comments, particularly with respect to Article 227, that
the recommendations of the Commission were not adopted by the Peace Conference
[…]. This essay in positive morality with its undertone of vengeance was to prove
embarrassing. In so far as it attempted to introduce morality into a new sphere it was
courageous but not in harmony with the spirit of the time. In so far as it was openly
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based on motives of international policy, it was open to the charge that there was no
due process of law. […] Thus the Kaiser was not brought to trial but in the legal
developments of the years 1943 to 1946 Article 227 was to have some value as a
precedent.112
The present article is developing a position that substantial and authoritative
German international law doctrine both before and after the war took it for
granted that wars of conquest, and therefore of aggression, were illegal. It is
now intended to show significant English and French international law doctrine
did not realize this and assumed that German international law doctrine was part
of the German intellectual consensus urging Germany to wage wars of
conquest. The critical English and French literature help also to explain why it
could seem natural for the Allies to have drafted Articles 227 and 231. All of
the German literature still to be considered also accepts the same normative
parameters but disputes, to a greater or lesser degree, their application to the
particular facts.
So in the view of this article, not surprisingly, the German response did not
question the normative parameters set by the Allies. Instead, they objected that
the question of responsibility for the outbreak of the war cannot be decided by
one side a party to the conflict, but only by an impartial commission of inquiry,
to which all records are accessible and which decide the measure of each
government’s responsibility for the fact of the catastrophe. After disputing the
Allied version of events and particular incidents, which were supposed to show
premeditation to war, the German response, disputing the accuracy of these
incidents, offered an alternative version of events. The primary factor was that
the Central Powers were significantly outnumbered militarily by the Entente.
Secondly, Germany did support Austrian military action against Serbia, but
judging the Serbian response virtually satisfactory, had pushed Austria to
negotiate. In this event, Russia became the key figure. It was pushing Serbia on
a course of ethnic nationalist agitation, which had the aim to ensure the
territorial disintegration of Austrian-Hungary. It effectively blocked German
efforts at mediation through a decision to partially and then fully mobilize. The
French themselves had long ago said such mobilization by Russia was
equivalent to a declaration of war. Germany had to declare war quickly on
Russia, as it would be the inferior military power in a two front war.113
32 Anthony Carty
114 Hueck describes him in these terms: “The liberal and cosmopolitan Albrecht
Mendelssohn Bartholdy […] was forced to emigrate to England in 1934,” Hueck (note
1), 205; Max Weber is of course regarded as a colossal international figure in the field
of sociological thinking in the twentieth century.
115 German White Book (note 105), 37.
116 Ibid., 39.
The factual accuracy of either this narrative or the Allied version of events is
not crucial to the thesis of the present article. Instead there are particular
excerpts of the response, and absences from it, which are especially pertinent.
That is, Germany does not dispute that a war should only be fought to remedy
a legal injury, nor that every peaceful means should be found to satisfy an
injury before recourse to war. Again supposedly liberal international lawyers
such as Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy114 and ultra prominent academics and
intellectuals such as Max Weber, participated in the response. These would not
readily put their names to the following phrases, unless a very elaborate
conspiracy had been played upon them. “Plans of conquest were worlds
removed from the thoughts of the leading German statesmen.”115 In particular it
is the following phrases which lead directly back to the heart of this article:
[…] It is one of the most lamentable mistakes of a section of foreign public opinion
that the reprehensible and irresponsible utterances of a small group of chauvinist
writers should be regarded as the expression of the mental attitude of the German
nation […]. It is a capital error to seek to place moral blame in quarters where in
reality nervousness, weakness in the face of the noisy demeanour of the above
mentioned small but unscrupulous group, and lack of ability to make quick
unequivocal decisions in difficult situations brought about disaster.116
This brings us back to the writers about international law in pre-war
Germany who were recognized abroad. This is why what was typisch deutsch or
not about German international law doctrine at this time is probably of large
historical significance, even although it may be difficult to measure that exactly.
The picture that emerges clearly in Great Britain and France is that what may
have been thought to be international law in Germany or its place in Germany
did not make itself felt abroad, but that may reflect at most a failure of the
German international lawyers already discussed to make their presence felt in
Germany. As will be seen later, that is precisely a central issue in dispute. 
A typical picture of how German international law was seen from abroad
shortly after the World War is provided by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. He
considers Hegelianism to have been in the absolute ascendancy “[…]
international law stood at the beginning of the present century at the point at
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which it was left by Hegel with his conception of the State as an absolute end
and of international law as external municipal law.”117 He goes on to mention
the names of Adolf Lasson and Erich Kaufmann.118 James Leslie Brierly also
shared Lauterpacht’s view of the influence of Hegel within Germany. In his
essay, which was the English version of his 1928 Hague Academy Lectures, he
launches a general attack upon the consensual foundation for international law
and he alleges that the most highly systematized form of the consensual theory
is the Hegelian doctrine of the self-limitation of the State as developed by more
modern authors such as Jellinek. By the doctrine of self-limitation a State may
create law for itself in internal and external affairs. International law is not
imposed on States from outside, but is merely the sum of the system of external
public laws of the States concerned. For Brierly this is a denial of the legal
character of international law. “[W]hat is commonly called international law
consists merely of certain non-obligatory usages which states in fact follow in
normal circumstances as a matter of convenience or from motives of
enlightened self-interest […].”119 In his Standardwerk, The Law of Nations,
Brierly, having equated Hegel with Jellinek, equates Jellinek with Germany:
[…] Modern German writers do not shrink from facing the full consequences of the
theory of a purely consensual basis for the law; they have inherited from Hegel a
doctrine known as the “auto-limitation of sovereignty,” which teaches that States are
sovereign persons, possessed of wills which reject all external limitation. So that if
we find, as we appear to do in international law, something which limits their wills,
this limiting something can only proceed from themselves. Most of these writers
admit that a self-imposed limitation is no limitation at all; and they conclude
therefore that so-called international law is nothing but “external public law”
(äusseres Staatsrecht) binding the state only because, and only so long as, it consents
to be bound.120
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At the time of the outbreak of war the importance of the ideological
foundation of German foreign policy was stressed in the collective British
document from Oxford University, Why We are at War. A whole final chapter
is devoted to what the authors call, The New German Theory of the State.121
The chapter begins: “The war in which England is now engaged with Germany
is fundamentally a war between two different principles – that of raison d’etat
and that of rule of law.”122 After describing the struggle in England in the
seventeenth century against the Stuart Monarchy’s absolutist pretensions, the
authors continue: “The same antagonism now appears externally in a struggle
between two nations, one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and
above the public law of Europe in order to secure the ‘safety’ of its own state,
while the other stands for the rule of public law.”123 For the rest the authors cite
the Machtstaatsgedanke of which Heller speaks, and refer to Fichte and
Treitschke. In particular they quote copiously from General Friedrich von
Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War,124 a disciple of Treitschke, also
regarded, with Erich Kaufmann as the key immediately pre-war exponent of
Hegelianism, in Heller’s work.125 This material is used by the British historians
to ground their assertion about the actual state of international law study in
Germany, just as Lauterpacht and Brierly have done. No self-respecting State
would sacrifice its own concept of right to any international rule, and, more
importantly, there is the glorification of war: “war aggressive as well as war
defensive.”126 Bernhardi is quoted as “speaking of the right of conquest of new
territory inherent in a growing people” where “the dispute as to what is right is
decided by the arbitrament of war.”127 The Professors express an understanding
in extenuation that Prussia, not Germany, suffers a geographical pressure from
her mid-European situation, which makes her feel strangled and has her
struggling for breath. “Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest
irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been easier for
England, an island State in the West, exempt from pressure, to think in other
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terms.”128 Nonetheless the Professors have to oppose that to the doctrine of the
self-preservation of the State, “[…] the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by
which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made.”129
Sensitive to a German charge of hypocrisy, they nonetheless confidently
conclude “[i]t is true that we have everything to gain by defending the cause of
international law.”130
For reasons of space it is not possible to give an exhaustive account of
English writings at the beginning of the World War. However, brief mention
should be made of the international legal historian, Coleman Phillipson who,
once again, gave very extensive treatment of von Bernhardi, “because recently
he has exercised such great influence in his country.”131 Once again the German
international lawyers are absent. Phillipson’s main concern is with the German
doctrine of necessity and the invasion of Belgium, which one is leaving aside in
this article, since eventually it was not an action defended by the Germans at
Versailles. Instead, one might stress how, from a historical perspective,
Phillipson was satisfied that there was a public law of Europe since Westphalia
and an international law, both of which prohibited a war of conquest. Phillipson
stressed that law was not morality and that he was talking of the former.132 Law
meant the rules which States must observe, rather than morality, which meant
merely what they ought to observe. When England began the war against
France in November 1792 it was because it annexed the Austrian Netherlands,
and, contrary to the Treaty of Munster, opened to all nations the navigation of
the Scheldt.133 Now the struggle is also a matter not merely of ethics, but of
international law, which can only admit those wars which are made for self-
defense and self-preservation.134 So, now Great Britain is at war because of
international law:
[…] we took up arms to prevent undue aggrandizement on the part of Germany,
whose long contemplated intentions were none too well concealed (a reference to the
above discussion of von Bernhardi). For to stand by and allow an aggressive country
to subjugate one State and humiliate another […] would certainly have been
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von Gestern. Koskenniemi prefers the tone of pathos, describing Le Fur’s tradition as
one born of another age, “a tradition that was silent about how to resolve the problems
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[…].135
The French reactions are similar, but more informed and penetrating. Louis
Le Fur attributes huge significance for German policy of what he describes as
German doctrines. He does not ignore the significance of legal doctrine in
Germany, but he claims that all significant German legal writing is absorbed
into a single, unifying radical subjectivism, which finds expression in an
imperialist, because completely subjective, German nationalism. Again he
means the equivalent of the triumph of the Hegelianism described by Heller,
but attributes the villainy instead to Luther and Kant. Writing in 1937 he says
the Germany of before the war, as now, has lost the notion of law in the
traditional sense of the word, so that force reigns supreme among States.136
Culture becomes so polarized among nations, that Le Fur sees a radical
subjectivization in protestant German culture from the time of Luther. Private
conscience and conviction are opposed to any objective, external reason, and
the individual as well as the State are above and beyond any external judgment.
This leads to a culture which vacillates between despotism and anarchy. Kant
turned religious ideas into philosophy in overthrowing the natural law of the
enlightenment, which Le Fur calls the authority of speculative reason and
theoretical truth. There is no objective good, and for Kant, the law of one’s
conscience is completely subjective. This is the way to Fichte and Hegel and
the idea that no law can transcend the human being. Law is always merely a
subjectively accepted self-restraint. Le Fur makes a simple equation that in the
absence of an objective rule, interest is the only guide and force the only limit
to its realization.137
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Le Fur draws from Kant’s theory of law the elements which he claims have
become central to German culture. The right of necessity is a licit action against
someone who has done no wrong. Necessity has to be understood subjectively.
He quotes an example from Kant of how one can push another away in a ship
wreck, here the threat of an uncertain penalty, that is a court judgment of the
death penalty, will give way to the fear of certain death through drowning. Le
Fur relates this directly to the fear Germany experienced in 1914, which it felt
justified it in violating Belgium’s neutrality. An uncertain supposedly objective
standard has to give way to a subjectively experienced concrete fear.138
There is a direct link between subjectivity of values and the choice of
constraint as the only possible criterion of law. Such constraint does not exist at
an international level and so States exist in a state of war. In the actual
condition of things force is the only law among States. It is Kant who is at the
origin of the idea that war is not submitted to law, as the warring parties
mutually agree to suspend the obligation to follow it during the conflict. The
States have the right to wage war, in the sense that they are free to subject to the
hazard of arms the resolution of their difficulties. Le Fur sees this approach as
consistent with the absence of objective natural law and resort at the State, as
well as individual level, to the principle of autonomy. What makes a war just is
the pure will of the parties. The two States, in Kant’s view, have agreed to war
as a suspension of law.139
Le Fur goes on to blame Kant for the doctrine of preventive war. Kant is
responsible for the argument that beyond the effective attack, there is the threat.
In his theory of law, Kant says that, with respect to menace: 
Il faut y rattacher les preparatifs par lesquels un Etat prend les devants et sur lesquels
se fonde le droit de prevention, et meme le simple accroissement d’une puissance qui
se rend redoubtable par l’agrandissement de son territoire. Cet accroissement est, par
le fait meme, et anterieurement a tout autre acte de l’Etat qui augmente ainsi sa
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puissance, une lesion faite aux Etats moins puissants et dans l’état de nature l’attaque
est tout a fait juste.140
Of course, in Kant’s system it is left to subjective appreciation how
threatening is an increase in a State’s power.141 The final stage of Le Fur’s
argument is merely to say that turn of the nineteenth and early twentieth century
German legal theory, theory of the State and theory of international law are all
a product of this much earlier tradition of Lutheran Protestantism and
Philosophical Idealism. Savigny and Jhering reduce law to the conscience of a
single people. Conviction realizes itself in action, which makes the former
effective.142
Law becomes the will of the sovereign, who limits himself through a doctrine
of auto-limitation. This sovereign will is inherently without any limits it does
not chose from time to time to accept itself. Laband, Jellinek, Zorn, Kohler,
Jhering and others exercise an immense influence in confirming in new
generations of Germans that there is no natural law of the objective good, but
instead an acceptance of the pure will of the State.143 Le Fur calls in aid George
Ripert to bring together lawyers and historians such as Lasson, Droysen, and
Mommsen, of whom Heller spoke.144 The logic of this cult of force rests in
subjectivity of appreciation of both interest and threat. Yet it is crucial that
these theories, according to Le Fur, overthrow the idea that war is only a legal
sanction and replace it with the idea that war is the source of law. The
references are to Treitschke, Lasson and, once again, finally, von Bernhardi.
Everything is the fatal result of denying any objective truth. Instead of war
drawing its force from the law which it has to realize, it is the law which draws
its force from the victorious war.145
This is a much more profound and systematic critique of German
international law culture than that offered by Lauterpacht, Brierly and
Phillipson. There is a vast French legal literature to back it up. Le Fur himself
also cites Pillet, Duguit and many others. Brief mention may be made of the
The Evolution of International Legal Scholarship in Germany 1871–1933 39
146 Space and maybe level of importance exclude extensive consideration of Gaston
Combescure, Les Deformations du Droit des Gens en Allemagne avant la Guerre
(1918); the thesis was sustained at the Faculty of Law of the University of Paris under
the judgment of Antoine Pillet and Géraud de Geouffre de la Pradelle. It constructed
the usual picture of German international law as seen by those most vocal in Germany
about its unimportance, Treitschke, von Bernhardi, Hartmann and Lasson. The
mainstream German international lawyers completely fail to surface, despite the fact
that the examiners must have known of them.
147 Jacques Marquis de Dampierre, German Imperialism and International Law
(1917), 19.
148 Ibid., 11–12; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 18
October 1907, 205 Consol TS 233.
149 de Dampierre (note 147), 23–24.
150 Ibid., 49.
151 Alfred Lasson, Das Kulturideal und der Krieg (1868).
work of de Dampierre and Combescure, which are book-length.146 The former
work was translated into English. De Dampierre is an archivist rather than a
lawyer, but his work is important, because its translation into English and
publishing in New York may help to trace the climate which decided that wars
of conquest were legally criminal and should be formally punished. The first
two chapter titles set the tone: International Law versus German Imperialism
and Violence as an Element in German Politics. De Dampierre explained that
the view of Germany as an aggressive cultural monolith rather than a nation in
the hands of a clique came with the notorious manifestos of the 93 intellectuals
and the German universities.147 There is a clear agenda here. “If the guilty
nation should conquer by brute force, then it is the duty of all the other states
signatory to the contracts which have been violated to frustrate the enjoyment
of such a victory.” Among the contracts is the Convention for the pacific
settlement of international disputes, at the Hague Conference of 1907.148
Tannenberg or von Bernhardi are descendants, by way of Treitschke, Lasson or
Ostwald, of a long tradition of thinking. It is Kant who says that in matters of
public interest it is not permissible for the scholar or the priest to reason.149
International law is based upon the safeguarding of the commonweal, while
Germanic ideas are of the legitimacy of conquest as the necessary expression of
that force which alone conveys a right to existence.150 The assertion of a right of
conquest by Germany and its denial by the rest of the international community
is de Dampierre’s central argument. He quotes Lasson from “Das Kulturideal
und der Krieg,”151 that disputes should not be settled by international
congresses, but rather by the sword, the only rational and lasting solution. De
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Dampierre says these ideas shocked in Germany when first published in 1868,
but now they have become usual.152 As Le Fur had noted as well, war had
already been glorified in moral terms in German culture from Kant to Nietzsche
and the chapter in von Bernhardi’s Germany and the Next War, “The Right to
Make War,” is only the final stage.153 The tendency of this book is to create a
climate of public opinion accustomed to the idea that there is a legal guilt
attaching to German conduct in starting the First World War. De Dampierre
concludes:
The proved premeditation of a conquest of Belgium by the German armies reduces
to vain pretexts all the elaborately constructed inductions and arguments of the
apologists of Germanism. The indisputable historical fact is that the German Empire
knowingly broke solemn engagements in regard to Luxembourg and Belgium, which
she had entered into previously, of her own free will and without compulsion; and
this is more than a repudiation of a treaty; it is an attack on International Law…all
the more so because it also infringes the Hague Convention V defining the rights and
duties of neutral powers […]. By these acts, the whole German empire, responsible
for the policy of her leaders, has incurred not only a moral guilt, but also a material
responsibility, which the co-signatories of the treaties of London and of the
conventions of The Hague will be one day or other in a position to determine. The
violations of territory which have taken place cannot be compensated merely by the
damages awarded to the injured party (a civil party) – in this instance, Luxemburg
and Belgium. A crime or misdemeanour involves, beyond the compensation for the
damage caused, a punishment proportionate not for the extent of the damage but to
the gravity of the fault. It is for the civilised world to constitute itself criminal jury in
this trial, a trial without precedent in history.154
D. Some German International Law Reflections in the Course
and after the First World War on the Causes of the War
The extent of responsibility for the First World War is still a hotly contested
matter in German historiography, and it would be foolhardy for an international
lawyer now to claim to speak with authority.155 However, this article is not
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about those events. Instead it is a historiography of how they were handled by
German international law doctrine and intended to encourage reflection about
what international law doctrine can have the ambition to do. Hence some brief
account of at least two approaches to the outbreak of war within German
historical scholarship is helpful to situate the legal doctrine and assess its value.
It is greatly to be regretted that for reasons of time and space, it has not been
possible on this occasion to follow up a survey of two reflective German legal
responses to the outbreak of the war, by looking also to several more abstract
reflections on the place of war as an institution in the system of international
law, which were made in the middle and closing years of the war.156
Already mentioned is the perspective of Schöllgen, that the German Empire
was quickly warned by Queen Victoria of the danger of preventive war. In
Schöllgen’s view, Germany was, in a manner of speaking, a victim of its
foundation through force. It knew itself to be surrounded by States which were
at least fearful, if not also resentful, and looking for revenge. It responded by
trying to make as many defensive alliances as it could, with Austria-Hungary,
Italy and, for a time, Russia. The idea was that each country would support the
other if attacked by a fourth country. The difficulty was who should decide the
meaning or extent of the notion of attack. Would it cover a Russian attack on
Austria-Hungary, where Russia attacked Austria-Hungary so as to prevent some
maneuver by the latter in the Balkans?157 Underlying Schöllgen’s comment is
the conviction that conflict between these two countries was inevitable and that
Germany’s interest was not truly involved in that conflict, i.e. in the Balkans.
Instead, Schöllgen thinks Germany should have accepted an offer of support
from England in 1898, even if it had meant a continuing subordinate role for a
time on the world stage.158 By rejecting the prospect of an English alliance and
occupying itself with Austria-Hungary meant since 1901 Germany found itself
on the defensive. With eight neighbors, Germany had no concept of how to
prevent these from coming to an understanding against it. The solution was
flight, “Flucht nach vorn.”159 This made an inexperienced leadership susceptible
to a nationalist mood, which, Schöllgen accepts, was well articulated by von
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Bernhardi.160 By the time of the July 1914 crisis, Germany thought it had to
support Austria-Hungary against Serbia, which was a real threat to Austria-
Hungary. This support Germany would offer even if Russia supported Serbia.
However, the Kaiser and Chancellor did hope to keep Russia out, especially
after the conciliatory response of Serbia to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum.
The German military wanted a preventive war, on the ground that war for an
encircled Germany was inevitable and Russia would be much stronger in a few
years time.161 These various grades of over-reactive and inconsistent insecurities
worked against one another to produce what was technically a preventive war,
with no clear goals, simply because Germany had in any case no concept of
what it wanted, other than the vaguest anxiety of the need to break out of an
undefined menace coming from all sides. An inexperienced and divided
government machine launched itself on an aimless military adventure. It had
somehow to defeat all the powers surrounding it, before they could launch a
fatal attack.
This representation of Germany almost as victim is arguably a consistent and
continuing conservative view that Germany as a nation repeatedly fails in terms
of political maturity. Hence Hans Peter Schwarz publishes, with the same
publisher as Schöllgen, his severe critique of German foreign policy up till
2005, with the title “Republik ohne Kompaß,” the main argument of which is
that Germany still has no idea of how to define its interests into any coherent
strategy.162 This is hardly a full-blown Hegelianism, and more resembles the
perspective of the German White Book in 1919. It had already objected that one
should not regard the reprehensible and irresponsible utterances of a small
number of chauvinist writers “as an expression of the mental attitude of the
German nation.” However, they also say the German Chancellor, Bethmann-
Hollweg had taken over a position “which demanded a degree of statesmanship
and above all a strength of decision which on the one hand he did not
sufficiently possess, and on the other hand could not make effective within the
structure of the German State as it existed at that time. It is a capital error to
seek to place moral blame in quarters where in reality nervousness, weakness in
the face of the noisy demeanor of the above-mentioned small but unscrupulous
group, and the lack of ability to make quick unequivocal decisions in difficult
The Evolution of International Legal Scholarship in Germany 1871–1933 43
163 German White Book (note 105), 39.
164 John C. G. Röhl, Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II und die deutsche Politik
(2002).
165 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, War der Kaiser an allem schuld? Wilhelm II. und die
preußisch-deutschen Machteliten (2002).
situations brought about disaster.”163 In other words the English and French
impressions of the place of international law in Germany, i.e. opinions of
Lasson, von Bernhardi etc. are quite not completely without foundation, but
they do not recognize that the German elites, which would include University
Professors of Public Law, never rethought their concepts of international law
with a view to waging wars of conquest and world domination. These
professionals simply failed, for whatever reason, to combat those
misrepresenting their discipline, before the outbreak of war. As will be seen in
this section some of them exerted themselves somewhat after the outbreak of
war.
A rather tougher assessment of the outbreak of the First World War comes
from Wolfgang Mommsen’s “War der Kaiser an allem schuld?” This book is
partially concerned with locating responsibility within the German State and
opposes the theses of John Röhl, in Kaiser, Hof und Staat,164 which treats the
Kaiser himself as the decisive factor in decision-making. Mommsen considers
the Kaiser was a significant part of a Prussian-German elite, but by no means in
complete command and often overruled.165 For reasons of space this extremely
important distinction cannot be explored. It relates to the whole viability of the
Hegelian model of the State as it came to be formally defined as State power
(Staatsgewalt) incorporated in the Monarch as the formal decision-making
organ of the State. This is vitally important because there was a so-called
Kriegsrat of 8 December 1912, at which the Kaiser and the Army and Navy
Chiefs considered the inevitability of war and discussed the idea of preventive
war. Lord Haldane had let it be known that England could not tolerate the
subjugation of France if a general war broke out as a consequence of Balkan
unrest. As general war was increasingly likely through a Russian Austro-
Hungarian conflict, it meant Germany had to reckon with England as an enemy.
The Kaiser convoked his Council, at which it appeared to have been decided
that a racial war between Slavs and Germans was inevitable and the question
was when. The Army wanted a preventive war immediately and the Navy
wanted to wait till the summer of 1914, when the Kiel Canal would be ready.
Mommsen does not agree with Fritz Fischer that here is concrete evidence that
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a decision to go to war was taken at this time.166 Mommsen draws attention to
the absence of the Chancellor from the meeting and says the meeting was
insignificant. It did not even represent an embedding of the idea of preventive
war in the mind of the Kaiser. A preventive war did, however, become part of
the thinking of the Army.167 That would count enormously when the Kaiser
came to respond to the pressure of Russian partial and general mobilization at
the end of July 1914. There is not time to consider whether German approaches
to international law would have been influenced by the discretionary power of
the Monarch, or instead, what should be the significance of the fact that power
floated amorphously around and within an elite that had no clear institutional
shape. The latter fact makes it difficult to assert that any idea of law would have
mattered to either the form or content of decisions leading to war. However,
Mommsen says there was unity among the elite to use the concept of the
unlimited authority of the Monarch constitutionally as the means to shield them
all, so as to legitimize themselves over against the parliamentary parties and
public opinion.168
Notwithstanding these reflections, Mommsen comes close to a picture of the
Machtstaatsgedanke. German elites had come to take it as a commonplace that
the way for Germany to assert its world power position was through a sharpened
arms race. The Kaiser had responsibility for the fact that by 1911 Germany was
engaged in a “maßlosen Wettrüsten [...] zur See und zu Lande,” for which he
had popular opinion behind him.169 Von Bernhardi’s book, Germany and the
Next War (1912) was representative of an ever increasing opinion in German
society that war was unavoidable, and so his concept of preventive war,
expressed with rhetorical force, had great influence on the public. It all became
a self-fulfilling prophecy.170
Finally, Mommsen substantially agreed with the Oxford Professors and the
Versailles Commission Report about the character of German policy during the
July crisis. At the time of the assassination Austria-Hungary decided on a
military operation to dispose finally of the Serbians striving for a Greater Serbia,
which would threaten the existence of the Monarchy. By the beginning of July
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the view in Berlin was that one could not once again fail to back its ally without
risking the alliance. So it was hoped that unrestricted support for Austria-
Hungary would compel Russia to withdraw support from Serbia. Thereby the
German leadership broke with its previous policy of pressing Austria-Hungary
to an understanding with Serbia. The decision was to leave Austria-Hungary
free with unqualified support, Germany remaining in the background but
accepting responsibility for the risk in testing Russia’s willingness to go to war.
The strategy was explained to Austria-Hungary as “Verteidigung eines ihres
Lebensinteressen,”171 although it had not been clarified, if Serbia was
responsible for the act. ( […] obwohl noch völlig ungeklärt war, ob die
serbische Regierung für diesen Gewaltakt überhaupt verantwortlich war.”)172
Mommsen’s main interest is to demonstrate this was not a decision of the Kaiser
alone, but a confident belief of the Reichsleitung that the war with Serbia could
be localized. The Machiavellian calculus in Berlin was to deliberately give the
impression abroad that one was not expecting a war. Hence, as the British
Professors had noticed, the most senior figures, including the Kaiser, went on
vacation in July. The Chancellor hoped to achieve a fait accompli in Serbia, and
then resume friendly relations with the Entente Powers.173
As it gradually became clear that Russia was ready to fight, some hesitation
and confusion entered into Berlin and Vienna. The English proposal of a four
power conference was fatefully rejected by the Chancellor, but not before it was
suggested to Vienna that the modalities of action against Serbia be discussed.
The extent to which the Serbs went to satisfy the Austrian ultimatum led to
hesitation by the Kaiser, but not firm enough to upset the course already
decided. Austria wanted its war and declared it. The decisive step following this
was the German, and especially the Kaiser’s attempt to put responsibility for the
war onto Russia – its partial and finally full mobilization as the causes for the
German declaration of war. The Kaiser expressed that such mobilization
signified:
England, Rußland und Frankreich haben sich verabredet den Österreichisch-
Serbischen Konflikt zum Vorwand nehmend gegen uns den Vernichtungskrieg zu
führen […]
[…] Das Netz ist uns plötzlich über den Kopf zugezogen und hohnlächelnd hat
England den glänzenden Erfolg seiner beharrlich durchgeführten puren antideutschen
46 Anthony Carty
174 Cited from ibid., 220.
175 Herrmann (note 11), 129.
176 Ibid., 226.
177 Von Liszt (note 90), 36–37.
178 Ibid., Preface, V.
179 In particular to note is Karl Strupp, Die Vorgeschichte und der Ausbruch des
Krieges, ZfVR 8 (1914), 655, 721, arguing that the aggressive intentions of Russia and
France would have justified morally a preventive war, just as the great Friedrich was
once so justified. However, the question did not arise because it was the Russians who
Weltpolitik […] in dem es uns isoliert im Netze zappelnd aus unserer Bundestreue zu
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dreht.174
Mommsen comments that this twisted the reality unrecognizably. The whole
point of German maneuvers had been to test Russian willingness to go to war.
The rest was detail. Germany’s plan for a two-front war was to go through
Belgium to attack France. Britain was asked to remain neutral. The rest is
history.
Herrmann identified that von Liszt was one of the signatories of the “Manifest
der 93” of 11 October 1914, which refused German blame for the war.175
Herrmann points out that the main blame was put on England in the eleventh
edition of his “Das Völkerrecht.”176 Von Liszt says that the express cause for the
war was the murder of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne. The Austrian
note to Serbia did not receive a satisfactory response, and Austria declared war
on Serbia. The attempts to localize the war failed. “Das englische Kabinett, in
dessen Händen die Entscheidung über Krieg und Frieden ruhte, ließ dem
Schicksal seinen Lauf. Die Mobilisierung der sämtlichen russischen Streitkräfte
zwang das Deutsche Reich zur Kriegserklärung an Russland (1. August) und am
3. August erklärte der deutsche Botschafter in Paris, daß Frankreich durch
Eröffnung der Feindseligkeiten das Deutsche Reich in Kriegszustand versetzt
habe. Und als Deutschland, um einem französischen Überfall von Belgien aus
zuvorzukommen, seine Truppen in Luxemburg und Belgien einrücken ließ,
führte dies zu einer Kriegserklärung Belgiens und Englands an das Deutsche
Reich (4. August).”177
This text went to press in December 1917.178 It may be inevitable that many
German international lawyers would have been in no position to see through
their government’s strategy and would put the responsibility for the war on
Russia or England.179 However, one might be more inclined to share
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Koskenniemi’s general argument that international lawyers were not equal to the
catastrophic events of the twentieth century, or indeed, in my view, equal to
anything very much at all.180 Given the prominence of von Liszt one can hardly
have imagined that even if the discipline of international law had been in
Germany, or anywhere else, as strong in academic institutions as von Liszt, von
Bulmerincq and others would have wished, that it could possibly have affected
events. They were too mediocre as people to make any impression on their
fellow countrymen. Koskenniemi remarks on von Liszt’s outrage when Alberic
Rolin informed members of the Institute of International Law that owing to the
impious war, the meeting scheduled for Munich had to be cancelled. Von Liszt
responded that far from being impious the war was sacred and sent in his
resignation. There was, Koskenniemi notes, a virtually complete withdrawal of
Germans from the institute. He continues: “Nothing demonstrates the isolation
and helplessness of the German international law community better than its turn
inwards, and backwards, into nineteenth century debates about the basis of the
law’s binding force.”181
Koskenniemi is aware of Walther Schücking’s “Die völkerrechtliche Lehre
des Weltkrieges,” in which, while the war is still raging, Schücking tries to
assess its causes in a legal aspect. Koskenniemi gives a brief summary of it in
the context of a much fuller account of his life. As throughout his work,
Koskienniemi presents the book as an expression of the personal beliefs of the
author, so “for Schücking any important conflict was bound to contain legal
claims,” but this did not have to mean inflexible methods of settlement, and
Schücking believed the will to war could be controlled “by tying the parties to
an efficient negotiating process.”182 Implicit in this description of Schücking’s
work is Koskenniemi’s view of him as a naive idealist, believing in the
rationality and goodness of men in “dark times.” He quotes a contemporary as
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describing the man as “a great child, a pure heart and an incorrigible idealist.”183
This method of history writing polarizes woolly minded, liberal idealists against
“dark forces of violence and reaction” and it creates a mood in the spirit of
Zweig’s reminiscences. Overly sensitive souls (Schönheitsgeister or Sunshine
People), arguably, deserve to become extinct. Instead, I would prefer to ask
whether as an international lawyer, Schücking was able to make an intellectually
credible strike at the issue of responsibility for the outbreak of the war.
A very substantial biography of Walther Schücking’s life and work has come
out of Kiel Law Faculty itself and been published in the series of its Walther-
Schücking-Institute. Bodendiek is primarily concerned with studying the man in
the domestic German context of pacifist movements and campaigns to support
international organization. The study considered here is barely mentioned.184
The main emphasis of this exhaustive study is upon the difficulties Schücking
had propagating his internationalist views in Germany. However, there is
important mention of Schücking’s very hostile reaction to the guilt clauses of the
Versailles Treaty and it is placed in the context of the general reaction of
German international law science. The intensity of this reaction is treated as
somehow an aberration by German scholars, not all necessarily mischievous, but
nonetheless hopelessly blinded by nationalism. Bodendiek quotes Michael
Stolleis that German international law science “habe sich wie selbstverständlich
in die vaterländische Pflicht genommen gefühlt.” Detlev Vagts, from a German
Social-Democratic family that went into exile in the United States, is cited as
saying that seldom has a nation been so obsessed by a Treaty and German
international law science shared this obsession. More to the point Bodendiek
quotes a well received lecture by Ernst Zitelmann, to the German Society of
International Law, that Germany was dragged guiltless into the war and then
had its faith in a law among nations shattered, and for that the principal guilt
rests not with Germany but with the Versailles Treaty itself.185 Clearly
Zitelmann and others are sharing the image of the Russian hordes that von Liszt
and Strupp accepted. Hence, I would speculate that they would not have either
known or understood that they were thought by their colleagues overseas to
have contributed to the general de-legitimation of the idea of law and of
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international law in Germany. What this article is trying to do is to explore legal
arguments that were used on their merits. The key point is the interface between
very traditional views about the nature of international law held by German
international lawyers and the fact that international lawyers everywhere usually
have no idea what their governments are really doing, whether in Germany in
1914 or in Great Britain in 1957 and 2003.186
Schücking’s “Die völkerrechtliche Lehre des Weltkrieges” was completed in
March 1917. In the Preface, Schücking warns that “heute haben wir gelernt,
wohin uns die ‘Realpolitik’ und der Kultus der Macht in Europa geführt
haben.”187 Schücking begins with some general remarks. International lawyers
repeat a thousand times the view of Grotius that war is a legal process, but once
the war begins, it is a matter of existence. Now the Allies have the goal to
dissolve the German Reich, while Germany plans the annexation of numerous
countries.188 Nor will he argue with what he calls so-called German intellectuals
who preach war as a biological basic law or natural phenomenon, such as in a
then recent article by Prince Bülow, appealing to the spirit of Bismarck.189
Instead it appears Schücking understood to some extent, how the First World
War came about and what institutional mechanisms were essential to prevent
this kind of conflict from recurring.
Whatever the tasks of ethics or theology, the task of the lawyer is to devise
forms for the peaceful solution to conflicts, which have the possibility to
exclude the use of force.190 Schücking says there are those naive spirits who
believe the present conflict is a product of one side having prepared for years a
detailed plan to launch a premeditated attack on the other, rather than the
conflict being a final twist of long drawn out years of mutual hostility and arms
races. Let anyone who believes such plans of attack existed produce them. There
were war parties in every country, but the question is whether the responsible
government instances were so disposed. Instead, it is the case that many of those
within government were so worried about the unforeseeable consequences of a
modern war that they did not want it. At the same time, the conviction that such
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fear was present among all parties had led to a practice of reciprocal bluffing as
a way of resolving concrete disputes, in the belief that the opponent would shy
away at the last moment from risking war. This diplomatic style led to
intransigence in negotiations, and however one wants to attribute the blame for
causing the recent war, such is the context in which to see the Russian
mobilization.191 Schücking recognizes that is the focal point for popular German
beliefs about the cause of the war.
To the dispute itself, Schücking takes it as given that Serbian officials knew
of the assassination, Serbian weapons were used, the leader of the plot was a
Serb official and connivance of frontier officials played a role. An issue of huge
prestige was involved for Austria-Hungary and also indirectly for Germany. The
threat of Greater Serb nationalism was known, as well as the desire of Austria-
Hungary to subordinate Serbia. Austria-Hungary had a legal right that was
injured. However, the international law position is clearly that Austria-Hungary
should have requested atonement and guarantees for the future. Only after this,
is one authorized to resort to force, a position Schücking supports by citing
Fauchille and von Liszt, the main German and French authorities.192 An
arbitrator could have considered the elements of the ultimatum, even if detailed
rules were not available to him. Serbia was a sovereign and equal State and
there were questions whether the ultimatum was compatible with Serbian
sovereignty, particularly the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in
judicial proceedings on Serbian territory and in the suppression of subversive
activities against Austria-Hungary, for an indefinite period.193 Russia and the
Entente saw this as an attack on Serbian sovereignty and the Hague Arbitration
would have had difficulty accepting it.194 While Austria-Hungary may have set
too sharp conditions in its ultimatum, nonetheless the tension with Serbia was so
severe – other Powers do not seem to have been aware of the extent of the
Greater Serbia propaganda in Serbia – that Austria-Hungary could not have
suffered the likely loss of an arbitration and hence it is not surprising that it
rejected the Serbian offer. One cannot say that it definitely thereby contradicted
the modern idea of international law.195
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The heart of Schücking’s book concerns the failure of mediation. He asks
whether Grotius would have accepted Austria-Hungary using force, provided it
was merely to obtain a remedy for the injury, but would also have justified
Russian intervention to defend Serbia’s sovereignty, if Austria-Hungary
intended to infringe it. The problematic character of the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum was also that its very short timescale made it virtually impossible to
localize the conflict, effectively forcing Russia’s hand. Austria-Hungary’s
refusal of mediation was strictly legally possible, although one could argue
under Article 2 of the Hague Convention on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,
this was required as far as circumstances permitted. Yet the Entente Powers
blame the Central Powers for the war at this stage, i.e. because of the refusal of
mediation, and clearly Austria-Hungary has taken on a huge responsibility for
the outbreak of the war. So we have to understand the grounds for the behavior
of the Central Powers.196 England blames the Central Powers for causing the war
by refusing Four Power mediation. It is true Austria-Hungary treated the
conflict with Serbia as involving its own vital national interest and would not
consider the wider danger to European peace. However, on balance Schücking
is impressed by the argument that a Four Power mediation would not have been
impartial, given the alliance between France and Russia, and that even England
admitted (Sir Edward Grey) it could not be fully impartial, where Russia was
concerned. 197
The difficulty with the rest of Schücking’s analysis is that he appears to
understand the last days before the war as ones of great confusion in which
numerous proposals to negotiate were being made on all sides and where, at
different times Austria-Hungary, Germany, England, Russia and Italy appeared
to be making some concessions and putting everything back on the table. If at
this final stage there is one Power Schücking considers had marginally the larger
responsibility for making war inevitable, it was Russia with its partial and then
full mobilization. It used the first stages of its mobilization to demand from
Austria-Hungary an undertaking to do nothing to infringe Serbia’s
sovereignty.198 He thought this clearly unreasonable as Russia offered nothing in
return except to halt mobilization. What Schücking did not appear to know was
that Germany had deliberately gambled on Russia not risking war. Also
Germany and in particular the Kaiser had not focused attention on the
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inevitability of England’s participation in the war against it. This was, however,
clearer to Germany by the end of July, as the Kaiser also hesitated over what he
thought the largely reasonable Serbian response to the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum. Schücking thought the conditions Austria wanted to impose on
Serbia extremely unusual,199 but that they could have been accommodated
through some form of international commission. The intensity and confusion of
the last minute diplomatic steps encouraged Schücking to think in future that no
State should be allowed to begin a war without having to go through a
compulsory mediation process.200 However, this proposal was not a naive liberal
belief in the value of mediation. He was aware of the possibility of the sceptics
that on the one or the other side there may in fact be a hidden will to go to war.
The development of international law to include compulsory mediation would
still work in such an event, because such a secret will to war could only exist
within governments and not in the general population. The effective
development of this legal rule will exclude the possibility that governments
could be misleading their populations that they are immediately about to be
overwhelmed by their neighbors. Without such a strategy a government cannot
win the support of the population that it must have to fight a modern war. The
secret will to bring about a war can only exist on one side and categorical rules
on mediation can make it impossible for a government in bad faith to work up
a conviction in its’ people that it is going to be overrun by an enemy.201
So Schücking’s narrative of the events leading to the outbreak of the war is
largely driven by his own scepticism that a European war had been planned,
although he is categorical that Austria-Hungary put the maintenance of peace
among the Great Powers below what it took to be its national interest.202 He
places great weight on the situation, becoming critical with Russian
mobilization, although he recognized that legally it was a sovereign right and a
defensive measure.203 He even appeared to suggest that the Russian military
were so much in control of this process as to undermine negotiations between
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the Tsar and the Kaiser.204 All along, Schücking would have been aware, as von
Liszt had stated, that it was the fear of Russian mobilization that had enabled the
German government to sweep up popular support in Germany for war.
However, the limits of Schücking’s knowledge of diplomatic events cannot take
away from two important conclusions. He always thought it a possibility that a
secret will to war actually existed. Secondly, his analysis of the legal situation
always assumed that, should such a will have existed, it would have been illegal.
He came very close to saying that the original Austro-Hungarian demands on
Serbia took the form of an ultimatum and did not constitute an appropriate way
to ensure the satisfaction for the injury which Austria-Hungary had suffered. If
he had known the intention of Austria-Hungary was always to conquer Serbia
and annex it, or otherwise to bring its political existence to an end, he would
have declared that illegal, according to his understanding of contemporary
international law. As von Bulmerincq, also he, Schücking, supposed that Grotius
was the standard. It is worth repeating Schücking’s exact words on this:
[…] Wie hätte Grotius geurteilt? Er hätte zunächst grundsätzlich den Krieg von
Österreich-Ungarn gegen Serbien gebilligt, soweit er wirklich nur bestimmt gewesen,
eine entsprechende Sühne und Sicherung herbeizuführen […] Für den Fall, daß […]
Österreich-Ungarn einen Feldzug gegen Serbien unternommen hätte, um die
Gelegenheit zu benutzen, diesen Staat seiner Souveränität zu berauben, wie das von
russsicher Seite behauptet wurde, hätte Hugo Grotius auch die russische Intervention
zugunsten Serbiens als gerechtfertigt angesehen […].205
Schücking further deliberates about the question and implications involved
when a State decides to force into submission another smaller State that has
injured it but offers sufficient atonement. After citing Travers Twiss,
Kamarovsky and Grotius again, Schücking appears to come down against the
Central Powers:
So kommen wir zu dem Resultat, daß wenn Grotius den Krieg Österreich-Ungarns
gegen Serbien nach der Antwort auf das Ultimatum nicht mehr als einen gerechten
angesehen hätte, er auch die russische Intervention vom Rechtsstandpunkt aus
gebilligt haben würde.206
This conclusion is hardly a failure of liberal conscience or of German
international law doctrine. It provides an at least fairly clear legal answer to the
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outbreak of the war, which is consistent with the mainstream of German
international law doctrine before the outbreak of the war.
The second major juridical reflection on responsibility for the outbreak of the
First World War will be Kantorowicz’s “Gutachten zur Kriegsschuldfrage of
1914.”207 This is perhaps a strange choice from the perspective of
Wissenschaftsgeschichte. The author was not an international lawyer and the
work was not even published until 1967. He was a very major legal theorist in
the first thirty years of the twentieth century, responsible for the Freirechtslehre,
which, given the very tortured intellectual history of Germany, has been thought
by some to be a precursor to the arbitrary style of judgments delivered during
the Third Reich. For a short while he enjoyed the distinction of a Chair in Law,
like Schücking, at Kiel University. Yet, within the sphere of international law
doctrine in Germany, it can certainly be said that Kantorowicz’s significance is
“gleich null.” My reason for thinking it should be a priority to have his book
translated into English is that it is the most intellectually serious contribution to
an understanding of the place of law in the outbreak of the First World War, and
the best guide to how far the place of international law doctrine in Germany was
both misunderstood abroad and unsuccessful in making itself felt at home. In
other words the choice of this text is to point to debates in themselves of
significance, because of their intellectual quality, both at the time of writing and
now.
Geiss published Kantorowicz’s Gutachten for the first time in 1967 because
he himself favored the view that Germany waged a preventive war. Geiss is
himself criticized among German historians for paying no attention to what
were the intentions of the other Powers. Even more categorically than
Mommsen, Geiss shows that all of the figures at the fateful 8 December 1912
Kriegsrat wanted preventive war and that the Chancellor fell in with this soon
after. The idea of considering Kantorowicz’s work is precisely to place him
within, not outside, significant German historical scholarship and wider German
intellectual debates, then and now.208 Kantorowicz is simply a creative legal
mind, who once turned a little of his considerable ability to international law. It
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is interesting that Geiss introduces Kantorowicz in terms even grimmer than
Koskenniemi’s warning about Schücking. Standing virtually alone in the
Weimar Republic Kantorowicz broke the taboo about German innocence in
1914, paying with a broken career and life, dying at a relatively early age in
exile in Cambridge England in 1940. Geiss notes, ironically, for this article’s
title that Kantorowicz’s work was regarded as “undeutsch.” Instead Geiss
identifies Kantorowicz’s striving, through various versions from 1923 onwards,
to construct a rational and democratic culture in Germany around acceptance of
responsibility for the events of 1914. Kantorowicz saw this undertaking as
essential to the democratization of German society in the early 1920s as Geiss
saw the same struggle continuing in the late 1960s.209
Kantorowicz accepts that in 1914 there was no formal legal concept that an
outbreak of war could be illegal. Instead he will build his argument around what
he calls werdendes Völkerrecht, measuring the existing law beside world peace,
practicality and justice. The question is then whether particular countries waged
what could be described as a justified war (einen im Sinne des schon damals
werdenden Völkerrechts nicht gerechtfertigten Krieg), having full regard to the
fact that such a growing international law is already powerfully present in the
consciousness of peoples. Kantorowicz means nothing idealistic about such an
expression. Instead he is thinking of actual public controversy in particular
European societies, such as the Entente Powers and Germany. It is meaningless
to try to banish the question of guilt out of the post-war world.210 To illustrate
these points Kantorowicz refers to the huge importance attached in Germany to
the Russian general mobilization effectively against Austria-Hungary and
Germany. Either this was reasonable because it was justifiable for Russia to
come to the defense of Serbia, or it was not because such Russian support could
not be justified. Assuming mobilization amounted to an intended attack, “Alles
kommt also […] auf die normative Frage der Rechtfertigung eines derartigen
Angriffs an […].”211 This is how the subject was understood in German public
opinion in August 1914 and after the Versailles Treaty. Without the threat from
Russian mobilization there would not have been the general public consent to
war, including the Social Democrats in the Reichstag. German public opinion,
with von Liszt following in the train, thought the mobilization unjustified.
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The next stage of Kantorowicz’s legal construction is to draw from general
principles of criminal law, not an existing code, but a thousand years of
deliberation about the normative logic of reflection upon everyday life: such
concepts as reflection, intention, carelessness, innocence, guilt, premeditation,
instigation. There are basic criminal law concepts to be found among all
civilized peoples (Kulturvölker). However, he draws a note of caution that such
lay language cannot simply be applied to 1914 out of context, e.g. to say simply
that Germany willed war in 1914. Such expressions are meaningless. Juridically,
what does “Germany” mean, or what was it reacting to? Context is
everything.212 These apparently domestic criminal law concepts become central
to the whole, completely original construction of Kantorowicz’s argument. He
will break up the phenomenon of the outbreak of the war into three parts, the
Balkans War, the Continental War and the World War. To each he will ascribe
a different level of responsibility. The first involves the idea of deliberate
intention, the second the idea of recklessness and the third the idea of
carelessness.213 However, it is necessary to return again to the issue of legality
itself.
Kantorowicz stresses that his particular agenda is to comment on the position
of the Entente Powers, who are responsible for the Commission Report.214 He
says that it is fact the Entente, and particularly Great Britain, that have chosen to
see the war in legal terms. It is for them a legal process to respond to wrongs
done by Germany.215 Kantorowicz joins in the common German objection to the
hypocrisy of particularly British policy, which is to cover State interest and
advantage in legal language, but he does not treat this Entente practice as
significant. The task he wishes to undertake is to offer a differentiated response
to the question of German guilt. The Treaty has compelled Germans to
acknowledge this guilt in legal terms. Kantorowicz very largely rejects the
Treaty position, but remains with some very limited responsibility for Germany.
Always unable to resist a style of black irony, Kantorowicz describes the
responsibility as much less than that of Austria-Hungary. Vienna instigated
Germany to help and Germany always saw itself as no more than that. At the
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end Berlin tried desperately to draw Vienna back. In the end whatever the guilt
of the Central Powers, it is far less that that of other Powers in other wars, for
instance the Italian attack on Turkey in 1911 or Rumania against Bulgaria in
1913. In italics he writes, “Die Schuld an einem großen Krieg ist nicht
notwendig große Kriegsschuld.”216 The problem is rather the extent of this war.
“Der Schaden des Weltkrieges war unermeßlich, die Schuld an ihm war es
nicht.”217 He is aware of the general historiographical points which have been
raised in this article and which concern how German international law doctrine
was seen abroad. Kantorowicz dismisses the Commission Report allegations of
aggression against Germany as without foundation. They reflect the influence of
so many Germans, including academics after the war broke out, the
unprecedented conditions of the Brest-Litowsk Treaty.218 They also betray,
through projection, the disgraceful intentions of the Entente towards the
Germans. This was not a war the Central Powers fought out of Machtgier or
Raubgelüst, but out of Furcht und Verzweiflung.219 There was a certain amount
of literature produced by what he disparagingly calls “our so-called German
intellectuals,” calling for World Empire, preaching the virtues of the
Machtstaatsgedanke.220 Kantorowicz is careful to discount the significance of
general opinion for the assessment of criminal guilt of individual government
officials. This has to rest on hard evidence, attaching to themselves particularly.
That is the way he sets out his case with respect to German and Austro-
Hungarian officials.221
German political culture was profoundly militarized and this will explain the
importance of the preference which the Army generals always had for the idea
of preventive war.222 However, Kantorowicz makes a crucial distinction, that the
German leadership was never in the grip of the language of
Machtstaatsgedanken. The latter supposes that a country should consciously use
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its superior economic and military strength to wage wars of conquest and
thereby increase its power. In a sardonic tone which Geiss recognizes must have
provoked the Reichstag that asked for the Gutachten, Kantorowicz discounts the
role of Machtstaatsgedanken, in favor of a clumsy policy of inducing fear in
neighbors without satisfying any defined German interest.223 He realizes that this
element of German literati were seriously responsible for giving the impression
abroad that Germany planned long in advance a war of world conquest. The
declarations of so-called intellectuals and professors once the war began
increased this impression. Yet such intellectual activity must not be given a
mistaken significance which then leads to a responsibility for Germany.224 With
this analysis Kantorowicz is effectively discounting all of the literature
described by Heller and also criticized by the Oxford historians, the British and
the French international lawyers mentioned here. He distinguishes himself from
Geiss, who does consider that in their speeches and writings the German figures
who appear in the reply to the Commission, such as Hans Delbrück and Max
Weber and those present at the 8 December 1912 Rat, e.g. Admiral von Mueller,
did think in expansionist Machtstaat terms.225
However, in determining the criminal responsibility of the German State,
Kantorowicz, writing again in a very disparaging style that his contemporaries
must have found irritating, describes how German foreign policy from the 1890s
was recklessly driven by policies which infuriated all of its neighbors and which
thereby carelessly, and without any clear concept of an advantage to Germany,
created a widespread fear of Germany in the whole of Europe and led to its
virtually complete diplomatic isolation.226 This, in turn, created in the German
leadership an increasing fear that they would be susceptible to attack from
forces already much superior to them, and growing more superior by the day.227
France and Russia alone were stronger and with Great Britain the constellation
of forces was very unfavorable indeed. Added to that, the weakness of Austria-
Hungary, Germany’s last ally, was very serious. It was in mortal conflict with
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Serbia, whose Greater Serbia ambitions, supported by Russia, were
incompatible with the continued existence of an Austria-Hungary that had
absorbed a considerable part of the Western South Slavs into its Empire.228 In
other words Kantorowicz’s interpretation of the intellectual climate of pre-First
World War Germany is fairly similar to Schöllgen’s, but expressed more
sardonically, as in the hands of a petulant, incompetent and confused leadership.
When this leadership plunged Germany into a completely unnecessary war, the
fear of Germany shared by the rest of Europe and most of the world, turned to
hatred.229 Germany and Austria-Hungary could have taken a different course.
The former could have abandoned its naval arms race. For Germany to come out
on the world stage, it should have simply been willing to accept junior
partnership for a while with at least one already existing World Power. Great
Britain was the obvious choice.230 Austria-Hungary could simply have taken the
South Slavs into a triumvirate Empire, as the Hungarians had been absorbed in
1867.231
Within this wider context, Kantorowicz uses his concepts of criminal
responsibility to determine the question of guilt for the events of 1914. Here it
is a matter of attributing responsibility to the actions of particular individuals
and groups of individuals acting in consort. At this stage Kantorowicz comes
close to Mommsen. He may have been regarded as “undeutsch” within
Germany, but in fact he very largely rejects the contentions of the Commission
on Responsibility for the Authors of the War, reporting to the Versailles Peace
Conference. It may be remembered that they attributed exclusively to German
responsibility for having started, in a premeditated fashion, a war of aggression.
Kantorowicz attributes the highest level of responsibility, deliberate intention to
start a war, only to Austrian-Hungary’s planned war against Serbia. He says the
record of the actual decision-makers shows that the ultimatum to Serbia was
intended to be rejected and the intention was to use military force to subjugate
and effectively eliminate Serbia as a State. This was Austria-Hungary’s project
albeit it had Germany’s backing. Kantorowicz is categorical that this is the first
occasion since 1879 that a Great Power in Europe declares war and uses force in
order to upset and change the balance of power (Machtverhältnisse) in Europe
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significantly.232 It was bound to be unacceptable to the other Great Powers and
to provoke a reaction. Effectively this is a premeditated, planned war of
conquest, for which Austria-Hungary is alone made responsible by
Kantorowicz. It was premeditated as Germany and Austria-Hungary had been
discussing this possibility for some time and the assassination of the heir to the
Hapsburg throne was a mere pretext.233 However, Kantorowicz does not deign
to call this a product of Machtstaatsgedanken. Instead, he calls it a War of
Desperation (Verzweiflungskrieg), the product of panic by a regime that knew
itself close to collapse, because it had no strategy to cope with the principle of
Slav nationality that was clearly a threat to its existence.234
Germany was responsible for what Kantorowicz called recklessness, exactly
in the sense agreed to by a contemporary historian such as Mommsen. This is a
criminal legal responsibility, but it does not amount to pre-meditated
aggression.235 It has to be said Kantorowicz is making a distinction here between
a well conceived or focused policy to use State power to achieve definite goals,
if necessary through conquest, and a reckless willingness to resort to “sword-
rattling” as a way of bullying one’s way through particular crises, whether
Bosnia-Herzegovina or Agadir. In the latter sense Germany did follow a belief
in Machtpolitik.236 However, when Germany assured Austria-Hungary that it
would go to war to support its ally in the event that Russia intervened on behalf
of Serbia, this was not part of a pre-meditated plan to go to war. On the
contrary, Germany’s governors may well have convinced themselves that there
was no prospect that Russia would intervene, because of internal divisions,
because of lack of military preparedness or whatever. Nonetheless, in terms of
criminal responsibility, this did not matter to Kantorowicz. Germany was
willing to live with this possibility. It gave Austria-Hungary the blank check
against Serbia, precisely on the understanding that come what may Germany
would be at its ally’s side. This was a criminal recklessness. This was
inconsistent with previous German policy which, e.g. during the just terminated
Balkan Wars, had not supported Austria-Hungary and called for a conciliatory
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policy towards Serbia. The Kaiser was also eventually disturbed by the extent to
which Serbia was willing to accommodate the Austria-Hungary ultimatum. Yet
the fact remained that the assurance was given and eventually not withdrawn
precisely because it was an assurance of honor given by one Kaiser to
another.237 Kantorowicz was at pains to stress that the defensive alliance of
Germany with Austria-Hungary was irrelevant here, as Austria-Hungary was
embarking upon an offensive war.238 Indeed there is an irony in the events of
1914, if one remembers the obsession of Erich Kaufmann, Adolf Lasson and
others, going back as far as Hegel, with the need to dishonor the pledged word,
the non-binding, or non-legal character of agreements. In fact Germany was
embarking on a war it could see was becoming of very doubtful advantage to it,
precisely because, in Kantorowicz’s view, the Kaiser had made a promise to the
Austrian Emperor, Franz Josef, which he regretted but felt he could not disown.
Kantorowicz stresses that Germany knew it was in uncharted waters, with a
certainty of Great Britain’s participation in the war, but there was no going back
on the word of the Kaiser.239 The conclusion of this argument was addressed to
German public opinion. Everyone in Germany, particularly Social Democrats,
and including expressly the author himself, thought they were being
overwhelmed by reactionary Tsarist Russian hordes, when in fact the German
Government had reckoned all along with the possibility of Russian intervention
and determined to endure it, as the price of a decisive defeat of the Southern
Slavs in the Balkans.
Finally, Kantorowicz considers Germany was criminally careless in plunging
itself into a World War, which was the significance he attached to the
participation of Great Britain. The argument here is based upon the fact that
Kantorowicz is certain it never occurred to the German authorities until very late
in July 1914 that the participation of Great Britain on the side of the Entente was
most likely. Kantorowicz thought this very careless indeed. Austria-Hungary
was even more careless, in thinking that as an old friend Great Britain would
never go to war with it.240 They should have known, from British support of
France in the Morocco crisis, the rapprochement with Russia since 1907 and
indeed the so-called Kriegsrat of 8 December 1912, which was provoked by
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British assurances that they would not stand by and let France be defeated.241
The panic in Berlin at the end of July did lead to three days of feverish German
diplomacy to persuade Austria-Hungary to modify its stance towards Serbia and
to bring it into negotiations with the Russians. There was also considerable
German effort to persuade the Russians to hold off from intervention,
particularly direct exchanges between the Tsar and the Kaiser.242 This must all
have served to create the impression, at every level of German society, including
the leadership, that Germany did not want war. However, the crisis was, in
Kantorowicz’s terms, brought about by criminal carelessness of the German
Government. Germany could still have stopped the war by simply telling
Austria-Hungary it would not support it in a war with Russia and assuring
Russia of this fact. This would certainly have been in Germany’s so-called State
interest, if one took a Machtstaatsgedanke perspective. However, in fact
Germany was trapped by the Ehrenwort des Kaisers.243 Here also the importance
of the military and their preference for the doctrine of preventive war came
decisively into place. The Army considered Germany needed the advantages of
speed and the military initiative to make up the preponderance of numbers that
the French and the Russians, and now also the English enjoyed. How far the
idea of preventive war could play a role would depend, and did at the end of
July 1914, on the relative weight of the Army in the Reichsleitung. That would
be huge at this point in time, because Russian mobilization, with a background
of the French alliance, meant von Moltke was pressing desperately for action.244
The whole idea of preventive war became the black comedy, that having
induced fear and even panic in large numbers of opponents, who otherwise had
no actively aggressive intentions towards you, you have to launch preventive
attacks on them individually before they can unite against you.245 The military
actively ignored and overrode the last minute indecisive attempts of the Kaiser
to intervene to stop the military timetable to war.246 Yet the military imperative
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had always been embedded in the political. If one has to fight, then the attack
has to be preventive, because the balance of forces are against us. In that event
the mad logic becomes that one cannot keep waiting to see if one has to fight.
Such deliberations would have left Hegel and his followers von Treitschke,
Lasson and Kaufmann bemused.
In conclusion, Kantorowicz has provided, in my judgment, the intellectual
creativity to grasp the entire panorama of Germany’s legal responsibility for war
at a time of the transition from the Kaiserreich to the Weimar Republic. He,
along with Walther Schücking, shows, how the terrible social and cultural
tensions of Germany in 1917–1923 stimulated a creative response to a situation
which the relatively mediocre, but otherwise harmless German pre-First World
War scholarship could not have anticipated. The only failure of the latter, in its
mediocrity, was not to rise to the challenges presented both by the
irresponsibility of German so-called intellectuals and political thinkers and also
to the serious immaturity of the political leadership of their country. Yet, in not
rising to these challenges German international lawyers behaved much as their
colleagues at home and abroad have behaved before and since. Figures like
Schücking and Kantorowicz will always be exceptional in any profession. It is
always difficult from within a profession to tackle problems which require
knowledge and understanding outside that profession. That is why the pursuit of
Wissenschaft and its Geschichte is often not very rewarding.
